

SEMINARS ON ADVANCED METAPSYCHOLOGY

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Volume III: Affects

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IIIa

III. Affects

(A) Bibliography:

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(B) Problems:

- (1) (a) What are the three phases of the history of the psychoanalytic theory of affects?
- (b) What are the main dynamic, economic, structural and genetic aspects of affective phenomena?
- (c) In what respects do Rapaport's doubts as to Jacobson's affect-theory manuscripts hold for Jacobson's published paper (bibliography #3, item 8) on affects?
- (2) (a) Seek out Schur's dynamic, economic (topographic?), structural, genetic and adaptive propositions.
- (b) Trace in Schur's rendering of Freud's various anxiety theories the dynamic, economic, structural, genetic and adaptive points of view.
- (c) What theory of anxiety (affect) is underplayed by Schur and what point of view with it?
- (d) What metapsychological consideration obviates Freud's "automatic anxiety" conception?
- (3) (a) Seek out the sense in which Jacobson uses the concept of pleasure principle.
- (b) What relationship does Jacobson postulate between the constancy (homeostatic) principle and the pleasure principle?
- (c) What is Jacobson's explanation of discharge and tension affects and what metapsychological point(s) of view does this explanation imply?
- (d) What is the significance of Jacobson's affect-classification and what point of view of metapsychology does it primarily invoke?
- (e) Would it be correct to say that alertness to and precision about the economic and structural points of view would have made it

possible for Jacobson to make her argument simpler and less vulnerable? Note specific imprecisions.

- (4)
 - (a) Relate Schur and Jacobson on the psychosomatics of affects and psychoses.
 - (b) What are Jacobson's metapsychological propositions concerning secondary narcissism and self and how are they related to depressions?
 - (c) What are gratification, narcissistic gratification and narcissistic identification? Do we have metapsychological definitions of these in Jacobson?
 - (d) How does Jacobson use the concept of fusion? How does she define self-esteem?
 - (e) On what points of view does Jacobson lay stress?
 - (f) How would you criticize what Jacobson calls "metapsychological conception of psychosis"?
 - (g) The cathexis and self-centered conception of depression; note its imprecisions.
- (5)
 - (a) Trace the problem of "supply" in depressions in Jacobson, Bibring, Schmale, and Spitz, with particular emphasis on the role of supplies (object) in the older psychoanalytic theories of depression (orality reinterpreted as need for aliment). Compare with Rapaport's "stimulus-nutrient."
 - (b) Trace Bibring's structural conception of depression and its relation to self and helplessness (passivity), and compare with Benedek's "depressive constellation."

- Rapaport:** Well, ladies and gentlemen, this is now the story of affects. What about the first question in the syllabus? What are the three phases of the history of the psychoanalytic theory of affects? What was the first phase?
- Plunkett:** Affect was equated with quantity of psychic energy or the drive-cathexis in the first historical phase as you describe it in your paper, "On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects," p. 277: "The dominant concept of affect of the beginning phase of psychoanalysis, in which no sharp differentiation between the theory of cathartic hypnosis and that of psychoanalysis had as yet occurred, equates affect with the quantity of psychic energy which was later conceptualized as drive cathexis. But while later the cathexis of affects is distinguished from drive cathexis proper and from bound (ego) cathexis, here affect stands for all of these."
- Rapaport:** To what point of view does this first theory of affects correspond?
- Schafer:** Economic.
- Rapaport:** This is an economic theory. Why should the first theory have been an economic theory? Why was it necessary? Actually, the next quotation tells it.
- Suttenfield:** It was an attempt to understand symptom-formation and implications for treatment.
- Rapaport:** Yes. But why? How does Freud spell it out?
- Gilmore:** Psychic functions. Something that should be differentiated. On p. 278 of your paper you cite this quote from Freud ("The Defence Neuro-Psychoses"):
 "...among the psychic functions there is something which should be differentiated (an amount of affect, a sum of excitation), something having all the attributes of a quantity...a something which is capable of increase, decrease, displacement, and discharge..."
- Rapaport:** Why was this idea of a quantity of excitation the first thing that had to be explained?
- Plunkett:** It was trying to explain the clinical phenomena of symptom-formation, where there is evidence of this increase, decrease, and displacement of psychic energy.

- Gilmore: Doesn't this have something to do at the time when these concepts were, when the Studies in Hysteria were dominant, and there the explanation of the symptom really would involve a theory of quantities.
- Rapaport: Yes. But why? I think you have the idea; try to spell it out.
- Gilmore: I was going at it in reverse. Because I think at that time the emphasis was on id contents and their vicissitudes; the structural concepts were not in the picture yet in any defined way.
- Rapaport: Yes, that is all true. But there is still another point here.
- Schafer: I think this was Freud's attempt to explain the therapeutic effect of abreaction.
- Rapaport: What does that mean? How was that necessary to explain abreaction?
- Suttenfield: Of course, in abreaction there is a re-release of affects, during the process.
- Rapaport: The abreaction looks like a release of affect. This is why the affect is equated with a quantity of excitation. Clinically it is a quantitative intensity that strikes one in the face. That's one historical point.
- Schafer: I have a biographical point in mind: this is Freud's earliest work after he left the laboratory. He was concerned with objective measurement and laboratory investigations--
- Rapaport: It is quite possible that that plays a role. There is a third point which is central. This is the first basic discovery of psychoanalysis. There are two basic discoveries to psychoanalysis. One of them is the explanation of the clinical observation that affects are seen somewhere where they aren't expected. How could Freud explain the observation that a patient in conflict over sexual feelings manifests that conflict through a paralysis of a hand? He did it by postulating a quantity of excitation that could be moved. In this sense it was an explanation of symptoms. That's the point, really. This is what he is trying to say. This was the basic intuition which made the observations for the first time scientifically amenable. This is one of the two great discoveries Freud made, and which he took seriously. The second thing he took terribly seriously (already discernible in the "Project" and certainly in the 7th Chapter) was the distinction between two things which he later termed primary and secondary process, the peremptory and the not peremptory behavior. If there were two things that Freud took dead seriously, from which everything else issued, it

is these two. Both of them are economic considerations, and we can see how the economic point plays a tremendous role in the beginning. The topographic came in immediately with it; that's true--particularly aided by the reflex ideas, but primarily this is an economic theory. What is the second theory?

White: That's summed up on page 288 of your paper, "On the Psycho-analytic Theory of Affects":

"The affect theory of the second phase of the development of psychoanalysis is a cathectic (economic) theory in that affect discharge (affect expression and affect felt) is a discharge of a definite part of the accumulated drive cathexis, termed affect charge. It is a dynamic theory in that affect charge is discharged as a safety-valve function when discharge of drive cathexes by drive action meets opposition ("conflict"). It is, however, also a topographical theory in that affect charge is conceptualized as a drive representation of the same order as the idea. It contains also traces of a structural theory, in that it stresses the importance of discharge channels by characterizing affect expression as discharge into the interior of the body, in contrast to action which is discharge into the external reality."

Rapaport: Would we accept this today? This structural point? What modifications would be introduced immediately?

Schafer: Well, it disregards the thresholds.

Rapaport: It disregards the thresholds, first of all. The idea of thresholds already played a role in Freud's thinking, though it was a very subordinate role, and one not clearly expressed. But there is a major point here which is wrong.

White: Is it the use of "structural" here to mean channels of physiological discharge into the interior of the body rather than using "structural" in terms of the concept of psychic structure?

Rapaport: Well, it is psychic structural as far as discharge-channels are concerned. This business of discharge-channels is demonstrated here in the back pages.

Schafer: Where you talk about effects using inborn channels as part of the pre-existing apparatuses.

Rapaport: Yes. The source of that is in Freud ("The Interpretation of Dreams," p. 521) and is cited on p. 280 of my paper:

"We here take as our basis a quite definite assumption as to the nature of the development of affect. This is regarded as a motor or secretory function,"--

"Motor and secretory function" implies that there are clear-cut organized somatic things, discharge-channels, available.

- White: Maybe my point's an erroneous one or a quibble, but I would differentiate between physiological structures through which discharge could occur and structure in terms of the concept of psychic structures.
- Rapaport: The point is well taken, but I would take care of it by saying that when we talk here about the motor or secretory channels of discharge we are always talking about their psychological regulations, and never about the physical pathways. When we talk about pathways of motility, we do not mean nerves and muscles. Where in today's material is this particularly clear? Who talks about this point?
- Plunkett: Schur talks about it.
- Rapaport: Yes. How does he call it, Dr. Gilmore?
- Gilmore: It deals with his ideas about desomatization.
- Rapaport: That's right. When he talks about desomatization he is considering concepts of the psychological regulation of the process, not the physiological mechanisms of the process.
- But now let's criticize the metapsychological considerations in my paper. What is lacking in it?
- Schafer: Well, there's no consideration of the genetic point of view.
- Rapaport: That's right. While the discussion had genetic considerations, they are not summarized. But to my great relief, on reading this now, five or six years after it was written, I find the paper is at least an attempt to be metapsychologically consistent. Even if I talk pro domo, it is a bit more systematic than the other papers we are reading. I looked over the correspondence I had with Hartmann about these two papers ("Affects" and "On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Thinking"), and I must say that in the correspondence he is quite systematic about these points. I am sure that I was influenced by that, not by his papers but by that correspondence.
- Anyway, you have here then a metapsychological statement, but this statement is in a way flat, because it does not put the emphasis properly. Where would you put the emphasis in this

second theory? This is in the same sense in which you talked about a hierarchy in the earlier session, Dr. White. While the emphasis in the first theory was clearly on economics, we could have traced the dynamics of that first theory also, we could have traced the topography of it, and also the adaptive aspects, because that which was defended against was reality or memory of reality. We could have done all that. But the emphasis was on economics, is that correct? Where would the emphasis be in this second theory?

Several: Dynamics.

Rapaport: That is a conflict-theory. Tell me, would we say today that it is purely a conflict theory?

Plunkett: No, because it brings in the question of inborn channels.

Rapaport: That's right; we would bring in the inborn channels, and would say that it is not all conflict but also control. Why is this issue of control important? Something in Jacobson that you should have noticed, makes this control business important. What is the point that Jacobson makes in arguing with me?

Schafer: She makes a point that there is an array of affects which seem to be experienced, for instance, in the course of gratification, which are not demonstrable as conflict-derivatives or conflict-expressions.

Rapaport: That's right. But it gets much more specific. Does anyone find a relevant passage from Jacobson?

White: How about the one you cite on p. 294 of your paper ("Affects")?
 "Most recently Jacobson has criticized sharply both the tension, and the discharge theory of affects. She argued justly: 'MacCurdy and even Brierley and Rapaport seem to ignore...that not only all normal ego functions, but particularly direct instinct gratifications, such as the sexual act or eating, are accompanied by intensive affective expression.'"

Rapaport: Yes, but this is quoted from Jacobson before Jacobson read Rapaport. Here is a complicated story which we should review; or otherwise you won't understand. Jacobson gave a paper. I read that paper and discussed it. I used that paper, that manuscript, to refer to here. But Jacobson published her paper after she saw the last version of my paper. So you see, this is a little complicated. Would someone read that passage from her published paper ("The Affects and Their Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities")?

Gilmore:

P. 49:

"Indeed, I believe that, despite their differences, MacCurdy's views, Rapaport's previous conceptions and Brierley's ideas and interpretation of her clinical examples have rather dangerous implications. All of them, in fact, come very close to assuming that affects in general are pathological phenomena due to a damming-up of psychic energy that cannot be properly discharged. They recall Reid's definition of emotion as 'a violent stirred-up state of the organism' and the popular conception of neurotics as 'emotional people.'"

Rapaport:

This is really the quotation. I hope you realize that I am not bringing this point up in order to continue my argument with Jacobson. I would like you really to give me the benefit of the doubt on this matter. But I do think that something important comes into view here. Earlier than this, Gardner Murphy would argue for many years on the early versions of my papers, on the 1945, '46, '47 versions of what later became "The Conceptual Model of Psychoanalysis" (Psychoanalytic Psychology and Psychiatry, pp. 221-247) and "On The Psychoanalytic Theory of Thinking," that psychoanalytic theory talks about thought only as a pathological product and contends that without defense against drive, there can be no thought.

Schafer:

How does that make all thought a pathological product?

Rapaport:

Murphy contends that psychoanalytic theory views thought as a pathological product because the theory states that defense is involved in its occurrence. By your question you already make the point which Hartmann and others make as being our present-day view of the matter. Jacobson, and prior to her Murphy and several other people, understood the psychoanalytic theory to mean that as soon as you involve anything like counter-cathetic organizations, you are dealing with pathology and that you are treating affect and thought in terms of pathology. You see that Jacobson didn't overcome this difficulty even though she had before her this paper which corrects this misconception, at the time she wrote her paper. She continued to assume that the conflict-theory of affects meant that affects are pathological products. This conflict-theory says that affect doesn't develop unless drive-expression is opposed. MacCurdy puts it that way directly and Jacobson quotes that on p. 48 of her paper: "If the organism responds to a stimulus immediately and adequately with instinctive behavior, no emotion whatever is engendered."

What rescues the conflict-theory from being construed to mean that affects in general are pathological phenomena? What is there in the Freudian theory of the second phase that makes affect not a pathological phenomenon?

- Schafer: Two things, I think. One is the safety-valve function, which has certain adaptive implications, and the other is the concept of channels, which would be a precursor of the idea of the affective experience as part of the original state of adaptedness.
- Rapaport: Take a look at this proposition.
"If the organism responds to a stimulus immediately and adequately with instinctive behavior, no emotion whatsoever is engendered."
What would you say about this proposition?
- Suttenfield: That isn't true.
- Rapaport: I agree. But why isn't it true?
- Several: It can't happen.
- Rapaport: Why can't it happen?
- Miller: Because, as you point out in your paper here ("Affects"), discharge is never complete.
- White: It can't happen because of the inborn thresholds.
- Rapaport: That's right. This complete discharge is an ideal picture. Insofar as I would subscribe to MacCurdy, I would take her to mean this as an extrapolation just as it is an extrapolation to say that when the object isn't present in the original situation, hallucinatory phenomena arise. That's a model. This is a model. In the actual situation there are always thresholds; these thresholds are heightened by countercaethetic energy-distributions which are developmental issues, not just pathological issues. Whether they become pathological or not depends upon how much these countercaethetic energy-distributions are tied directly to regulation by drives, and how much are they regulated by those two supersystems, the ego and the superego and their relationships.
- Plunkett: Freud's theory in this phase could be interpreted to mean that there could be complete drive-discharge.
- Rapaport: Well, what point is there in Freud proper, which I quote, which says that affects are not just pathological? What definition of affects makes that perfectly clear?
- Miller: Drive-representation. ["On the Psychoanalytic Theory of Affects," p. 282, where the reference to Freud is to "Repression," p. 91.]
- Rapaport: That affects are drive-representations.

- Schafer: Well, yes. But by implication they're representations of thwarted drives.
- Rapaport: Well; you can look at it that way and make it appear to apply only to situations of pathological conflict, but Freud can be interpreted to mean that it can occur in normal circumstances too.
- Plunkett: It seems to me it's implied in Freud that it's only when the drive comes into conflict with the environment and cannot be discharged that you get affect-charge or affect-representation. If the drive could be completely discharged there would be no affect; there would be no need for affect to arise.
- Rapaport: Let's put it this way. Though Freud does not deal in detail with that question, the second phase theory can be understood to include normal affects without contradicting anything Freud said.
- Schafer: I think you can come at it in a different way. If you look at Jacobson's statement again, the pathological thing would be damming up of psychic energy. That's what it hinges on. And if you think in terms of the development of the reality principle, as a promotion of health rather than pathology, one of its implications is the necessity for damming up or delay of drive-discharge.
- White: If you take the view that there has to be a difference in energy-potential for these various things--such as affect, thought, etc. --to occur, just as there has to be for any work to occur, then you get away from pathological conflict as the only cause of differences in energy-potential. It's not necessarily a pathological conflict; it's a structure.
- Rapaport: True, but we learn that only in the third phase of the theory. I tried to bring this up to help you see the confusion that can arise about the conflict-theory without this metapsychological treatment, such as I attempted on p. 288 ("Affects"). By such a metapsychological treatment of the problem you can see that this second theory, labelled a conflict-theory, does not necessarily imply that all affects arise from pathological conflicts.
- However, metapsychologically this treatment on p. 288 is not a very fortunate treatment, because it does not indicate that the central point of this second phase of theory is the issue of conflict, nor does it indicate clearly the role of thresholds here, nor does it have an adaptive statement or a genetic statement.

Miller: Does Jacobson mean anything that makes sense when she says that all normal ego-functions are accompanied by intensive affect-expression?

Rapaport: Oh, I think that she exaggerates, but certainly we have heard something about this from Freud. In the Seventh Chapter he states that this is why the development of the secondary process tries to restrict affects to the point where they become usable only as signals (p. 536). But we know from everyday experience that this is an ideal rarely approximated and our everyday thinking is liable to falsification by our wishes, affects, pleasure-pain regulations.

Miller: I guess it's her overstatement of this that I would question.

Rapaport: Yes, it is an overstatement. It would be interesting to follow this further, but we have to go on. How about the third affect-theory?

Miller: There's a very succinct statement about it on p. 292 ("Affects").
 "In the first theory, affects were equated with drive cathexes; in the second theory, they appeared as drive representations, serving as safety valves for drive cathexes the discharge of which was prevented; in the third theory they appear as ego functions, and as such are no longer safety valves but are used as signals by the ego."

Rapaport: Yes. That's my summary. How about the crucial Freudian statement from The Problem of Anxiety which I quote on the same page?

Miller: "'Anxiety...[as any] affective state...can... be experienced only by the ego.

"[Anxiety is] not to be explained on an economic basis;"
 --that is, it is no longer a safety valve--
 "...is not created de novo in repression but is reproduced as an affective state..."

Rapaport: What does de novo refer to, what kind of clinical condition?

Miller: Actual neurosis.

Rapaport: Actual neurosis is what it refers to. Now what are the next Freudian statements concerning anxiety?

White: There's a spate of them on pp. 296-297.

Rapaport: Let's have it.

White: It seems to me the one most apropos to our present discussion is the one on the top of p. 297 ("Affects"):

"The danger situation is the recognized, remembered and anticipated situation of helplessness. Anxiety is the original reaction to helplessness in the traumatic situation, which is later reproduced as a call for help in the danger situation. The ego, which has experienced the trauma passively, now actively repeats an attenuated reproduction of it with the idea of taking into its own hands the directing of its course."

Rapaport: This is the anxiety-signal.

Gilmore: There is another relevant part in the next passage:
 "...the ego acquired control over this affect and reproduced it itself, making use of it as a warning of danger and as a means of rousing into action the pleasure-pain mechanism..."

Rapaport: That's the means by which the pleasure-pain mechanism effects the reinforcement of the counter-cathetic energy-distributions. This is then what kind of theory? What stands in the center of this theory?

White: The structural concept.

Rapaport: Definitely. What is the next central point of view here?

Schafer: Both genetic and adaptive.

Rapaport: That's right. The genetic I would emphasize because the genetics of one point is stressed particularly. The genetics of what?

Schafer: The danger situation.

Rapaport: That's right. The genetics of anxiety is treated throughout The Problem of Anxiety in terms of the genetics of the danger situation. That is the crucial argument Freud really brings for this. I am not saying that this is so well worked out here in my paper; as I told you, the genetic point of view is not well worked out there. I want you to see the deficiency in the attempt I made to be reasonably systematic, the deficiency in my attempt as well as in the others. We would have been spared many a thing if we had been as systematic about all this as we probably could be now.

Schafer: This is the point of view on which Schur bases his whole discussion.

- Rapaport: Yes, and we should turn to that in a minute. First, though, I would like to make sure that we spell out what the adaptive point is here. All adaptive considerations start with what?
- Schafer: The inborn apparatuses.
- Rapaport: Yes, with the inborn adaptedness. So the basic adaptive consideration of this theory is that there are apparatuses in the human being from the beginning on which are attuned to certain danger-situations in the environment; they are coordinations guaranteed by evolution. These are the two quotations on p. 296 ("Affects"). The adaptive point of view always starts with the consideration of adaptedness, which is obviously a question of inborn apparatuses. Then follows the complex relationship between the genetics of this danger-situation, which is the genetics of adaptation, and the genetics of the adaptive processes, in the course of which there is a coordination made between this original state of adaptedness and the internal danger.
- Schafer: So genetics and structure are the same thing.
- Rapaport: That's right. Or you could say we're talking about genetics and structure of the same thing. Only the structural details are not spelled out--excepting where? The structural situation is spelled out by Freud in the addendum to The Problem of Anxiety, where he discusses the counter-cathetic conditions.
- Schafer: It comes in also when he talks about the formation of the superego in relation to the change in the nature of the danger-situation.
- Rapaport: Yes, there too. I would advise that you all reread those parts of The Problem of Anxiety Roy just referred to concerning the superego, in relation to the addenda on counter-cathetic energy-distributions, and you will find the argument I presented in the last session bolstered strongly.
- Let's skip now the further discussions of Jacobson. Besides p. 49, on pp. 56-57 and 58 there are points in Jacobson which would come under this.
- But before we go on I would like to make sure that that aspect of the structural point of view which comes in Bibring is clear. I would like to have first the direct statements concerning the nature of depression as an affective state.
- Gilmore: There is a passage on p. 27 ("The Mechanism of Depression") where he states:
 "...depression represents an affective state,

which indicates the state of the ego in terms of helplessness and inhibition of functions."

Rapaport: Yes, his comment "helplessness and inhibition of functions" is directly relevant and just before that, on p. 25, there is the ground on which he draws this conclusion.

"Though the persisting aspirations are of a threefold nature,"

--meaning the eliciting conditions of depression--

"the basic mechanism of the resulting depression appears to be essentially the same."

And on p. 24 he says:

"From this point of view, depression can be defined as the emotional expression (indication) of a state of helplessness and powerlessness of the ego, irrespective of what may have caused the breakdown of the mechanisms which established his self-esteem."

And here is the last point, on p. 40:

"According to the viewpoint adopted here, depression represents a basic reaction to situations of narcissistic frustration which to prevent appears to be beyond the power of the ego, just as anxiety represents a basic reaction of the ego to situations of danger."

Note that this helplessness here is related to considerations of passivity. The panicky anxiety, the untamed form, represents a relation to passivity, while the signal-anxiety represents a relationship to activity. The problem of activity and passivity can be followed through The Problem of Anxiety. Anxiety is that which is first experienced passively and later is used actively by the ego for signal purposes.

But in the main, what Bibring has to say is that depression is a reaction to helplessness. He makes that clear on p. 36:

"...depression...is--essentially--'a human way of reacting to frustration and misery' whenever the ego finds itself in a state of (real or imaginary) helplessness against 'overwhelming odds.'"

I would add that this occurs whether these overwhelming odds are internal or external.

Schafer: I think as it is it's not a sufficient statement as to why depression is the outcome of such a state.

Rapaport: What is Bibring's answer on that point? There is a reference to boredom here. Do you know it?

Schafer: Pp. 29-30:

"The dynamic conditions of boredom, which too

represent a state of particular mental inhibition, have been discussed by Fenichel (1934) and others, most recently by Greenson (1953). According to the definition of Lipps (quoted by Fenichel) boredom is a painful feeling originating in a tension between a need for mental activity and the lack of adequate stimulation"--

- Rapaport: What does "lack of adequate stimulation" mean here?
- White: Excessive counter-cathetic barriers?
- Rapaport: No, that's the cause. What is the lack of adequate stimulation?
- Miller: No aliment.
- Rapaport: That's right, but what does that mean?
- Schafer: Absence of the object.
- Rapaport: Yes, absence of the object. Either actually or, as Dr. White put it, because excessive counter-cathetic energy-distributions superimposed upon the impulse itself do not allow getting hold of the object. Are you reminded of the first model of passivity (Rapaport, "Some Metapsychological Considerations Concerning Activity and Passivity")? Indeed, the conception has one of its roots in Fenichel's paper "On the Psychology of Boredom," which we discussed before, as you may remember. But this is what is meant in the model of passivity, for better or for worse.
- Plunkett: The lack of adequate stimulation or the ego's incapacity to be stimulated--this would apply to the counter-cathetic--
- Rapaport: That would be Dr. White's point. That's right. The need for activity felt but since the aims are repressed--meaning there is no access--there is an incapacity to develop direction from within. Anxiety, external danger, is involved, and a coordination to external danger. Depression is the first model of passivity. If the original primitive state of the undifferentiated self, and of the original primitive ego, which does not yet have means to find the object and to get out of this situation, if these primitive conditions continue the organism is in the state conceptualized by the first model of passivity.
- Schafer: From the standpoint of affects, the ego--or maybe I should say the self--originates in depression, in the depressive position...
- Rapaport: That is the shadow of the observations that prompted Klein to come to a conception of a depressive position. From our point of view, the ego originates in a maturational and developmental

process from an undifferentiated state. The depressive situation arises of necessity within this state in terms of what the first passivity model describes and what Bibring describes as the depressive ego-state or depressive affective state, which then may be triggered into being again by similar situations of helplessness, either connected with the fate of aggression (resulting in secondary blows to self-esteem, self-directed aggression) or with direct blows to self-esteem due to actual deprivations, actual disappointments, etc. But this is a structural conception of a state; it is clear that this state is very primitive and is described only in such terms as the primitive self, which Jacobson uses in her big paper, "The Self and the Object World," which we discussed earlier. That there was such an early and helpless state of the ego with an associated affective condition we call ancient or archetypical depression is what makes possible later depressive states of almost identical form when that earlier state of helplessness recurs because of adverse conditions in the person's life, though the triggering conditions are very diverse.

The significance of the Bibring paper cannot be overstated. Bibring does several important things: he analyzes the varieties of triggering situations and the commonality of the result; he points out that in addition to anxiety, depression is another structuralized affect; he differentiates between the external roots of anxiety (the danger to which the infant is exposed because its coordination to the external world, guaranteed by inborn adaptedness, is always to some degree inadequate) and the internal roots of depression. These internal conditions are those which I tried to link and characterize in the first model of passivity ("Some Metapsychological Considerations Concerning Activity and Passivity"). Do you see these relationships?

- Plunkett: The first model of passivity is the inundation by drives.
- Rapaport: It is the exposure to unendurable tension without the possibility of doing anything about it.
- Schafer: It seems to me that Freud [The Problem of Anxiety] and later Schur ["The Ego in Anxiety"] postulate exactly the same condition as the origin of anxiety. Freud uses this same consideration in explaining the infantile prototype of anxiety, rather than depression, that is the state of helplessness and the reaction to it--
- Rapaport: Bibring points out that Freud distinguished these two things. How?
- Schafer: Bibring introduces the idea of fight vs. giving up--

Rapaport:

One of the two passages where Bibring discusses this is on p. 28. In the middle of the page he says:

"Clinical observations show that depersonalization often develops in place of an acute outburst of anger, and for that reason it has been classified as 'defense mechanism,' though it is difficult to define the actual process. One may describe it more generally as acute blocking in statu nascendi of overwhelming tensions (aggression and others) within the ego..."

This is a state of helplessness. At the bottom of the page he says:

"The anxiety which threatened to overwhelm the ego was blocked in statu nascendi or 'bound' (anti-catheted) as long as the danger lasted, and liberated only when the danger subsided."

Thus drive-tensions are productive of anxiety only insofar as they would lead again to the external danger-situation. He differentiates this from the conditions which lead to depression in the earlier passage we have already quoted before--p. 40:

"According to the viewpoint adopted here, depression represents a basic reaction to situations of narcissistic frustration which to prevent appears to be beyond the power of the ego, just as anxiety represents a basic reaction of the ego to situations of danger."

Gilmore:

I have another reference to this point on p. 34, where he makes some of these points in the comparison between anxiety and depression.

"To clarify the status of depression still further, it may be helpful at this point to compare depression with the feeling of anxiety, particularly since the latter has been brought in close connection with the feeling of helplessness (Freud). Both are frequent--probably equally frequent--ego reactions, scaling from the mildest, practically insignificant forms to the most intensive, pathological structures. Since they cannot be reduced any further, it may be justified to call them basic ego reactions. From the point of view elaborated here, anxiety and depression represent diametrically opposed basic ego responses. Anxiety as a reaction to (external or internal) danger indicates the ego's desire to survive. The ego, challenged by the danger, mobilizes the signal of anxiety and prepares for fight or flight. In depression, the opposite takes place, the ego is paralyzed because it finds itself incapable to meet the 'danger.' In extreme situations the wish to live is replaced by the wish to die."

- Rapaport: Do you understand the differentiation Bibring makes? He makes clear that there are two kinds of states of helplessness. In the first, which leads to anxiety, the organism has available its inborn mechanisms which guarantee its coordination to danger. In the second, which leads to depression, the organism is faced with either an internal situation (accumulation of drive) or an external situation for which it has no adequate coordinate behavior. It is helpless. Nothing can be done. This revives the original internal situation which is called the depressive ego-state. There is nothing to be done. There is no coordination. Anxiety-signals won't do any good. If we only had the time we could clarify this more by discussing Spitz's paper, "Anaclitic Depression."
- Schafer: In this formulation there is an implied sequence of reactions with anxiety being the primary one, and when anxiety-signals don't work, that then a giving-up may occur.
- Rapaport: I'm terribly sorry, but according to what we know, this will not hold. There are two different ego-reactions. One of them is linked to an external situation of danger. When that external situation appears, the ancient fear is triggered. That, in the course of development, becomes linked to instinctual tension-accumulations, if and when those tension-accumulations would lead to such a danger-situation outside. There is another series of situations in which tension-accumulation occurs, but that tension-accumulation does not lead to a danger-situation--it just doesn't lead anywhere.
- White: Like what?
- Rapaport: There is no tension-release possible if the situation has no connection to that original danger-situation for which there is preadaptedness. The reaction to such situations can be considered the more ancient.
- Schafer: Into which category would a state of hunger in an infant fall? Wouldn't it originally be a danger-situation in the sense of a prototype of anxiety?
- Rapaport: I am sorry, but I would have to say we don't know. We reconstruct that there are two original situations. Let me clarify one thing; maybe this will help. Is it correct that the first point in anxiety, as we reconstruct it, is that there is a danger-situation and to it an inborn fear reaction? Is it correct that there is only later a coordination of that to instinctual accumulations, tension-accumulations? One could hypothesize, for instance, that before this coordination takes place the situations of tension-accumulation are such that there is a situation arising which is characterized by the first model

of passivity. One could go that far. I don't know whether we should, but one could go that far. Or take it in Erikson's terms, mutuality. There will be mutuality-regulations. Some tension-accumulations of the infant will be such that mutuality-regulations between infant and mother correspond to them, and therefore something will be done about them, whether in terms of anxiety-signal or something else. Some of them will be such that they evoke, in that particular infant, no mutuality-signals, or in the parent no corresponding mutuality signals. Then there will be an accumulation of tension in the infant of the kind postulated in the first model of passivity. Clinically such a tension-state is epitomized in the anaclitic depression.

I would say that the anxiety-reaction certainly is the later, more complex, and more developed reaction. It is the one which is more tractable. It is the one which is more likely to bring about coordination of the infant with the environment, because mutuality-signals are involved. Think a moment about what you do when you feel anxious. You ask for things, you talk with people; you seek reassuring responses from them of some kind. But when you are depressed you don't ask for things. Whatever people offer you, you don't take any. Why don't you take it? That's again understandable very well in terms of activity-passivity, because you have already asked for it, and therefore it is not the real McCoy--the real McCoy is the passive gratifying drive-discharge, where the tension is diminished without your having to do anything.

If being depressed is what you are doing, then you are already having to ask for it; and that is no longer full passivity. This example is obviously on a very high and complex level. But do you see what I am trying to convey to you with it? In one of them, the anxiety state, there are signals, to oneself, to the others. In the depressed state there is just nothing that you want to convey to anybody. The situation seems really hopeless.

Whatever mutuality was achieved was achieved as a restitutive phenomenon in later phases of ego-development. The passive business, the depressive business, are all signs that there was not a sufficient vestige of this ancient coordination, or, if it was there, it was not used sufficiently or was not reciprocated by the care-taking person. The accommodation to this was the heightening of thresholds and resultant tension that can't be discharged. At this stage of our knowledge this is how we view this. Bibring is the person who has done most to clarify this point.

The main thing I want you to see is how the metapsychological treatment of these issues can help us to bring together such

disparate matters as anxiety, depression, activity-passivity, superego, ego-ideal, self, superego, ego, id. To be complete, all these issues have to be seen synoptically. I chose these papers on affect because these contributions bring such issues together, and don't allow us to treat them disparately, discretely, as separate matters.

Was anybody struck by something in reading Schur which is somehow related to this discussion of anxiety and depression?

- Miller: Do you mean the distinction between the traumatic situation and the danger situation?
- Rapaport: Yes. Would you mind digging it up? I thought we might meet on its own merits the issue Roy raised, without dragging in the rest of the literature. But our job is really to connect things, besides doing metapsychology.
- Miller: On the first page (67) of "The Ego in Anxiety" he says:
 "A situation is traumatic if the excitation reaches such proportions that the organism experiences utter helplessness. A situation implies danger if a traumatic situation may be anticipated."
- Rapaport: You see, this is a sharp distinction made. What would follow?
- White: That there are two kinds or stages of anxiety, the primary anxiety, in which there is this utter helplessness, and the other, in which there is an anticipation, in which the ego uses anxiety instead of just passively experiencing it.
- Rapaport: Would Schur call that first one anxiety?
- White: Yes. This is the primary anxiety, to which he feels all anxiety can be genetically traced.
- Rapaport: Can be genetically traced, true. As far as the genetic point of view is concerned, both he and Freud trace the whole thing to the traumatic situation. But--?
- Miller: But when he talks about what Freud calls anxiety in the signal theory of anxiety, he calls it awareness of danger.
- Rapaport: This is one thing. Secondly, if I see it correctly, he does not call this antecedent anxiety. This is the genetic antecedent, the traumatic situation. But that he does not call anxiety. Is that a fair representation of what Schur says?
- Schafer: He refers to it at one point as homeostatic swings in response

to stimulation, under the heading of pre-ego responses. He treats anxiety as an ego-phenomenon and in discussing this in connection with pre-ego responses is discussing it as a total organismic response without that label.

Rapaport: What does that imply, if you take into consideration also what Jacobson had to say in the paper on self ("The Self and the Object World")? There was a definite set of genetic propositions there.

Schafer: The precursor there was the silent physiological discharge-processes.

Rapaport: I had in mind that she, just like Hartmann, postulates an undifferentiated phase which she equates with a predecessor of the self, a phase out of which a differentiated self arises--when? When what begins to differentiate?

Schafer: It's another aspect of the id-ego differentiation.

Rapaport: When the id-ego differentiation begins, then a differentiated self, first not very realistic, but irrational and primitive, and then later more realistic, begins. What Schur is saying here is that the traumatic situation corresponds to that undifferentiated phase. That means a phase in which the ego does not yet exist in a differentiated way. Therefore its apparatuses, which are inborn channels of anxiety-discharge, are not yet usable; the inborn coordination between reality danger and these channels is not yet generalized, remains highly specific if it is usable at all; and therefore in this state there is no safety-valve of the sort which the original anxiety-response would provide, no signal-function which the developed anxiety-response, the signal anxiety, would provide. So Schur creates a genetic theory of anxiety in which anxiety has a predecessor which belongs to the undifferentiated phase. In that phase it is not anxiety. Taking Bibring into consideration, that could very well be regarded as the ancestor of that ego-state which is revived when depression is brought on--whatever the precipitating conditions are.

Schafer: But that's also the ancestor of anxiety.

Rapaport: It is also the ancestor of anxiety, with the reservation that anxiety, when it becomes what it becomes, is not a generalized ego-state, as this one becomes, but has already, in the undifferentiated phase, begun to employ an existing apparatus, namely the discharge-apparatus for what later becomes the signal-apparatus. It is a more specific thing. What does Fenichel say in "The Ego and the Affects" about the relationship of this ancient kind of predecessor of anxiety and the signal-anxiety? In the adult person does the anxiety always remain a signal?

- Plunkett: He speaks of it in terms of the regression that can take place, where instead of being a signal it becomes again strictly a discharge-phenomenon, where the adult may behave like the infant or child in the diffuse discharge--
- Rapaport: That's right. What is the simile he uses?
- Schafer: Powder-keg.
- Rapaport: That's right. The signal is like a match put into a powder-keg-- that is, when the regressive potentialities are present. Now what is the parallel between the regressive point Fenichel makes and the point Schur makes?
- Plunkett: Schur says that the regression is not just a memory that is revived, it's an archaic state which revives earlier economic conditions.
- Rapaport: Fine. But that is not the parallel to Fenichel. It's very good to bring it up; to whom is that parallel? You know the passage where this is said by Schur?
- Schafer: On p. 91 of "The Ego in Anxiety" he says:
"In regression more than a memory is being re-enacted. Regression can restore archaic situations and thus re-create the old economic conditions."
- Rapaport: Very good. To whose conception of affect is this parallel?
- Schafer: Bibring's.
- Rapaport: Obviously. Again, I am trying to show you that the literature has a convergent trend here. Metapsychologically, what kind of trend converges here?
- Schafer: Genetic.
- Rapaport: First of all the genetic. We have already traced it. Who would try to formulate what the convergent genetic trend is?
- Miller: In general, toward primary models or prototypical states.
- Rapaport: Yes, that's fine, but spell it out much more closely. Apply that specifically to affects. A trend in regard to the application of the genetic point of view emerges. What is that trend?
- Schafer: I guess you'd have to say the organismic experiences in the undifferentiated phase.

- Rapaport: That the predecessor in the undifferentiated phase is sought. That's one genetic proposition. But there is another genetic trend. Which is that? The emergence from the undifferentiated phase is considered as what?
- Schafer: Structure. It's closely tied to the differentiation of the ego and id.
- Rapaport: That's involved there, but what is it in regard to the affect?
- Schafer: Progressive taming.
- Rapaport: Progressive taming. That's what Schur is talking about; that's what Freud was talking about; that is clearly what Fenichel talks about and uses Freud's taming expression--which comes from where?
- Miller: "Analysis Terminable and Interminable."
- Rapaport: Right. And Bibring is not specific on that point. Now this is a genetic consideration for the emergence. After the root and the emergence, what third genetic consideration do you have to take into account?
- Several: Regression.
- Rapaport: The regressive point is always emphasized by all of them. Now genetically, how about regression? There is a specific point about regression in regard to affects which is more than just that it is a regressive product. Bibring states it the most clearly of all of them. What is revived, according to Bibring?
- Suttenfield: An earlier ego-state.
- Rapaport: An ego-state is revived. That is, what is being revived is an already early-organized state or specific affect. It is not ad hoc production, that is to say. This is a general trend. You find it in Schur and you certainly find it in Bibring. As a matter of fact, when Freud speaks about the series of predecessors of anxiety, he is already on the track of that kind of thing.
- Schafer: Is it justified to say that there's a convergence on its being an ego-state? The earlier proposition about the undifferentiated phase would require one to say that the end-point of the regression would be a pre-ego state.
- Rapaport: Any regression to the undifferentiated state would be so inchoate that neither anxiety nor depression would be discernible. And we see that actually in severe psychotic regressions. This is the kind of thing which Jacobson refers to when she says that in

the schizophrenic all the structure breaks down. Do you recall that passage?

Schafer: "Contribution to the Metapsychology of Cyclothymic Depression," p. 64:

"This goes along with a severe regressive distortion of the object- and self-representations, leading to their breakdown and their eventual dissolution into primitive images, in the system ego. The ego and superego identifications will disintegrate and be replaced by 'narcissistic identifications,' i.e., by regressive fusions of superego, of self- and object-images. These processes may reach the point of a collapse of the psychic systems."

Isn't that an overstatement?

Rapaport: Yes, I would say--it's putting it mildly to call this an exaggeration. You see such a thing maybe only in classic cases of Meynert's Amentia; in pure hallucinosis. One may still get this impression in cases of terminal general paresis or some cases of rapidly developing catatonic excitement.

So we see what the genetic point of view is and what its application implies, but in the meanwhile we have touched on the structural businesses also.

Schafer: Just to finish off that point: customarily, the emphasis on regression would refer to the early stage of id-ego differentiation.

Rapaport: Yes; or already-differentiated primitive ego, the synthetic function of which is so primitive that it does not yet use the discharge-channels with sovereignty, and certainly doesn't yet use signals with a sovereign accuracy.

I want to make clear that talking, as some people do, about pre-ego states, and about transitional objects and pre-objects and I don't know what else--that that courts metapsychological havoc. Because what is there to be understood or to be proven? It is very difficult in the early days of infancy to distinguish any specific affect-manifestation. Sometimes you distinguish it, the next minute you don't distinguish it. We have direct observation on this now, for instance in Peter Wolff's work. He is watching the first 8, 10, 15, 20, 25 days of the infant; and he sees elements of what later we would call ego-functions. But they fluctuate; they disappear; today you see them, tomorrow you don't see them; or this hour you see them, the next hour you don't see them. The concept we have, that the apparatuses are already present in that undifferentiated state but are not

so integrated as they will be later, is a crucial conception.

When I discuss affects in this much detail, I am also trying to bring you back to what we discussed about the ego two years ago, to see it a little bit more concretely. You remember, at that time we had to be quite theoretical about it. I hope that this drives home a point; we can't dwell on it any longer.

Plunkett: I'd like to come back to the similarity between Schur's and Fenichel's concepts. The way I think the two are similar is in Schur's concept of resomatization, that with regression there is also the resomatization of anxiety, which is probably somewhat similar to Fenichel's concept of the match and the powder-keg. Schur carries it to the next step, which would be that of panic, where there is complete somatization, leading into a state of shock, perhaps.

Rapaport: That is really a crucial point and I am glad you bring it up, because I would like to dwell on it. While Fenichel talks about a psychological panic-state, Schur talks about resomatization. Any metapsychological comment on desomatization and resomatization?

Plunkett: The point is both economic and structural.

Rapaport: What is the structural point?

Plunkett: Well, somatization, as I see it, has to do with channels of discharge, available channels and thresholds.

Rapaport: Is there agreement on that?

Schafer: I would agree that that's part of Schur's discussion.

Rapaport: Yes, I would agree with that also. But how about metapsychologically--is that structure?

White: If you think of the thresholds and inborn apparatuses as part of the pre-ego or early ego or inborn apparatuses around which ego-differentiation occurs--

Rapaport: Yes; where are they? Are they in the body? In the soma?

White: Not if you're going to talk metapsychologically about it.

Rapaport: Not if you talk metapsychologically: that's one of the several points I wanted to clarify. Let me recall for us what the definition of instincts is in Freud: the mental representations of demands made by the body on the psychological apparatus. It is a borderland concept, but for metapsychological

purposes it excludes any discussion of the nature of the physiological demand. Before we go on with that, did any of you find some such psychosomatic propositions in Jacobson's "Contribution to the Metapsychology of Cyclothymic Depression"?

Miller: That's about endogenous psychosomatic phenomena, on p. 63.
 "The onset of the psychosis proper is characterized by a dangerous, irresistible defusion or, as I would prefer to say, deneutralization, of instincts, which unleashes a furious struggle for supremacy between the libidinous and the destructive forces."

--Then this footnote--

"We may well speculate that the underlying psychosomatic processes in psychoses result in a reduction and exhaustion, or else in an insufficient reproduction, of libidinous drives, which enforces a reversal of the neutralization process and changes the absolute proportion between libido and aggression in favor of the latter."

End of footnote.--

"Whatever sets it going, this struggle may lead eventually to a fatal libidinous impoverishment, an accumulation of sheer aggression, and a dispersion of the defused instincts in the whole self. I suspect that the 'endogenous' psychosomatic phenomena in psychosis, to which I pointed above, arise with the development of such a state."

Rapaport: Dr. White? You shook your head. Would you put it into words?

White: Well, the footnote, for instance:

"We may well speculate that the underlying psychosomatic processes in psychoses result in a reduction and exhaustion, or else in an insufficient reproduction, of libidinous drives..."

I don't know what "insufficient reproduction" is or what that could possibly refer to--

Rapaport: That I can explain, though I would agree that it's hard to make sense out of this whole statement. This part means that either the libidinal supply is exhausted by something that happens in the body, or once it has been exhausted by psychological activity, the usual somatic processes which give rise to that supply do not function and therefore there is an insufficient resupplying. That much can be understood. It isn't perfectly lucid, but that can be followed. That is not really the point. What is the point of dissatisfaction? Or should we be dissatisfied?

Miller: It seems to me that this has the same trouble that we touched on

a minute ago; if you're going to talk metapsychologically, you're not talking about things that are somatic.

- Schafer: She calls it psychosomatic, and I think we have to consider that she used that word advisedly.
- Rapaport: All right, and what does that mean? Does that difference make a difference or doesn't it?
- Schafer: It's conceivable that certain alterations of homeostasis in the body may become chronic and enduring and have their own consequences. I don't know very much about physiology, but I think the various findings about the production of ACTH and cortisone and so on suggest that there may be a basic alteration of the physiological processes which are the body's demands on the psychic apparatus.
- Rapaport: Yes, that is conceivable in an abstract sense, but the question is whether a theory ought to make extrapolations into a realm where the methods of proof are not extant. You know, what she says here could be taken to say that cyclothymic depressions are somehow organic. That refers to the limbo of the unknown. It's altogether different from saying that certain ego-apparatuses are not available for use, or have not been developed. But whatever objection one has against what she says here, does the same objection hold with the same force for Schur's concepts of desomatization and resomatization?
- Miller: I don't think so. I take those concepts to refer to things that one can talk about metapsychologically. He indicates a psychic structuring and taming with the word desomatization, and then a regression from that or some kind of decompensation of it that he describes as resomatization. These seem to me more psychological concepts than what Jacobson is talking about.
- Rapaport: Why? That is the point I would like to clarify.
- Miller: Because when he talks about something that is somatized, he's talking about inborn discharge-channels that one needn't think of in terms of bodily organs but can think of in terms of psychic apparatus. I think it's a sloppy use of the word, but conceptually it still makes sense.
- Schafer: I was thinking that the "re-" and "de-" refer to the extent to which psychic representations of these physiological phenomena may be observed in their developmental changes, and so on. He's not talking about the somatic processes per se but about the extent to which they are replaced by or represented in psychic functioning.
- Rapaport: Part of what you say, Roy, Dr. Miller would accept: that these

can be talked about metapsychologically because somatically observable general discharge depends on the psychological representation and control. But there is another point in what you say that I doubt Dr. Miller could accept. To be sure, it is clear to the observer that in the beginning much more is directly expressed in actual somatic processes than later on. A child is more mobile in face, in hand, etc., than he becomes later on, so about children one talks about the somatic. That change--that desomatization--we have discussed before. I don't know whether it is fortunate or unfortunate, but it certainly does not involve the fallacy that the somatic processes are themselves sources of energy specifically discussed, or sources of deficiency, or sources of malfunction. That mistake Schur doesn't make.

You remember that we characterized the psychological apparatus as a superordinate controlling apparatus over the somatic; that we considered the ego a superordinate controlling apparatus over that which is id; that we considered the superego another controlling apparatus which is controlling over the id and over the ego in a most complex way, as if grids were layered one over the other which with smaller and smaller outputs of energy control bigger organizations which work with greater energy. Schur is trying to represent that from the outside, as it were, to show that in affect-development there is at first open somatic expression, while later less and less of that takes place. We can smile without too much movement of the face and be very happy inside without jumping up and down as the child would. So desomatization is a phenomenological description of considerable power.

We have to see that though there is indeed such an observation, if we derive from it conclusions or conceptions about the somatic and not, as Dr. Miller put it, about the situation with regard to the controls which allow for that observed development, then we make a mistake. If we keep that clearly in mind in looking at these papers, we see that Schur doesn't make the mistake but that Jacobson does. Certainly, when we talk about affects we talk about something which has to do with psychological control-apparatuses that pertain to the somatic also, just as in regard to action we talk about such.

Can we drop this point now? Let's consolidate points (a) and (b) of question 2 in the syllabus, and try to go through what Schur's dynamic, economic, structural, genetic, and adaptive propositions are. First, where did you find dynamic propositions?

Gilmore:

I have one that may be dynamic and economic, I think. P. 68 ("The Ego in Anxiety"):

"Any attack on the vexing problems of anxiety

has to start from the concept of a 'situation,' which always involves the sum total of a precipitating excitation and the response of the organism. The traumatic character of the excitation depends on the aspect of thresholds. The differentiation between precipitating excitation and response is simple in the case of external excitation, e.g., that of pain inflicted on an infant, or of a rattlesnake attacking an adult. Its application to internal excitation is more intricate."

- Rapaport: One could argue that bringing in the thresholds, and thus forces pitted against each other, makes this dynamic. I think you will agree, Dr. Gilmore, that this is going as far in interpreting as we have ever gone. What else can we find?
- Schafer: On p. 89 where he's trying to solve one of Freud's difficulties, he says:
 "Anxiety causes repression. Repression causes frustration. While repression does not make for anxiety, it creates danger, and thereby indirectly anxiety, thus closing the circle."
- Rapaport: Thus first of all this is really mainly a Freudian proposition, or an amendment of a Freudian proposition. But please try to clarify in what sense this is dynamic.
- Schafer: First of all, it's dynamic in the sense of treating anxiety as a motive of defense.
- Rapaport: However, if you take the point of view of The Problem of Anxiety, you could argue that this first point--anxiety causes repression--is a purely structural consideration, couldn't you? Or you could argue that there is an economic point involved too. Is that correct? Dr. Miller disagrees.
- Miller: I can't imagine a purely structural proposition.
- Rapaport: Okay. Thank you very much. True. But tell me, is it closer to a purely dynamic proposition, then? I am trying to take this to pieces to see where the dynamic point of view lies. Will it lie in this proposition that anxiety causes repression, Roy?
- Schafer: I think it's partly there.
- Miller: It lies more in the pairing of repression and frustration.
- Rapaport: How is that dynamic?
- Miller: If one stretches a little--just a little--it has to do with the pitting of forces against each other.

- Rapaport: Yes, and that a force is prevented from acting. Fine.
- Schafer: In the proposition that repression creates danger there's a sort of supplementary dynamic proposition--that the instability of this opposition of forces may have its own consequences.
- Rapaport: I would say that that's in the main an economic proposition, accompanied by content issues, since the danger really lies in the tension-accumulation--the damming up as a consequence of the frustration. That's how I would have thought about it. If I am missing something, please point it out to me.
- Schafer: It may be stretching, but it seems to imply that the instability here itself becomes a kind of motivating force. It becomes a new determinant of behavior.
- Rapaport: Anxiety itself does apparently play the role of a force. Let's remember that in his definition danger is anticipation of the traumatic situation. Under the pressure of the dammed-up accumulating cathexes, the force is being reinforced, if you please; and with it an anticipation arises. That anticipation is a motivation because it is capable of bringing the pleasure-principle to work. And that in turn has economic consequences and possibly structural consequences. I would concede that anxiety, and affect as such within the ego, can take on the role of an ego-interest, of an ego-motivation. I would concede that point, but it's a highly interpretive one. Does anybody have a stronger statement in dynamics?
- White: There's a stronger one on p. 95 ("The Ego in Anxiety"):
 "If this self-perpetuation of anxiety occurs in many areas of functioning, it creates the need for a state of constant preparedness of the ego. It corresponds to Freud's term of Angstbereitschaft (preparedness for anxiety) coined still in the context of his old anxiety theory. Liddell's concept of vigilance has similar connotations: constant vigilance requires high cathexis of defenses, which in turn facilitates ego regression in that defensive area."
 Then he talks about the precarious equilibrium.
- Rapaport: Yes, that's the point Roy already had reference to. While this is a strong statement, it's a very complex one. From your clinical experience you know that under certain conditions, the ego's hyperalertness is a highly stable personality characteristic. This vigilance from our point of view becomes as much a question of the economics of attention-cathexes as anything else; and true attention itself can serve as an ego-motivation,

an ego-interest, etc.

But we are on too high a level. As far as anxiety and affect in general are concerned, we are still left with no other basic dynamic proposition but the statement that repression creates frustration.

Schafer: I think there's a second one in his distinction between the regressive evaluation of danger and the regressive reaction. He speaks of defenses against the regressive reaction as being crucial to the degree of experienced anxiety--the final anxiety manifestation. This comes in as a sort of secondary step, but it's central to the whole question of what happens in anxiety.

Rapaport: Fine. If you don't mind, I would like to take a detour here. Keep in mind that our problem still is, what are the dynamic propositions concerning affects in general and anxiety in particular. But Roy brings up a point that has to be clarified. Remember, we have already had Schur's first proposition concerning anxiety, the distinction between the traumatic situation and the danger situation. The second is the distinction between the anticipation and evaluation of the situation, and the reaction to it. Both of these distinctions are crucial to his whole theory; without either of them the whole paper couldn't exist. Now as long as we are at it, what is his third important proposition? He attributes it to Freud.

Schafer: Secondary anxiety?

Rapaport: No, though that could be a fourth. That is really what I hoped we would get as an answer to the question about what metapsychological consideration obviates Freud's automatic anxiety conception. Well, how about that? Freud had two kinds of anxieties, one which was produced ad hoc and the other which was signal anxiety. How does Schur eliminate this dichotomy? Why is there no automatic anxiety or anxiety produced ad hoc?

Plunkett: Because for him that's a regression to earlier ego-states.

Rapaport: Because even that is a regression to earlier ego-states, or earlier evaluations and reactions to situations.

Plunkett: It's a regression to the earlier state where the earlier economic condition is also recreated.

Rapaport: An economic situation is also recreated. Fenichel did the same thing, didn't he? He said that there is taming, and that the question is only whether the tamed one remains a signal or whether the structural and economic situation is such that it will be a match lit over a powder-keg. These propositions are

identical, but Schur spells it out. Are we clear, then, what the structure of Schur's theory is? a) It is an assertion that there are two situations discussed; the traumatic situation and its anticipation, which is called the danger situation; b)--Roy?

Schafer: There are three parts to that first distinction. There's the thought-like awareness of potential danger that he brings in.

Rapaport: But that refers to a high-level anticipation and so would be connected with the second distinction.

Schafer: It seems to me a lot of this whole discussion hinges on this point, because in his anxiety theory he ultimately practically replaces affect by thought, and he makes a point of this several times.

Rapaport: But that is connected with the whole consideration of how he deduces the secondary anxiety. Is that correct? Not connected with secondary anxiety, but with how he deduces it. This is the desomatization business once again. This replacement of affect by thought is just the ideal end-product of the taming or desomatization process. The ideal is that highest level of control which operates purely by thought.

Schafer: I thought it was important in connection with the idea of segregated affect-charge, for which this seems to me an alternative formulation.

Rapaport: I would agree with that, but I would say that the basic theory of Schur hinges on this dichotomy, traumatic situation, anticipation of traumatic situation, which is the danger situation. If you explicate this proposition, then you find that there is a question of the anticipation and the response to it. If you see this second dichotomy clearly, then you can see clearly that this whole process of proceeding from the traumatic situation to its anticipation is a desomatization or taming process; if you see that clearly enough, then you can see no distinction between anxiety produced ad hoc and signal anxiety, because both of them are resomatizations or untamings or genetic revivals of the same economic situations as Dr. Plunkett discussed it. So here you have in a nut-shell the argument of this paper. It is a credit to the paper, I would say, that it can be summarized this way. I would like to call attention to the fact that as much as you would break your neck, you couldn't do this to several other papers which we have discussed, which have also very considerable merits.

I would like to summarize. With considerable time spent, with considerable efforts put out by several of us, we have found only vestigial traces of any discussion from the dynamic point

of view. Let me add, any time the genetic point of view is pushed into the foreground and structural considerations as are always involved in taming are pushed into the foreground, and where economics plays the central role, emphasized repeatedly by Dr. Plunkett--with the attendant adaptational considerations which we didn't discuss but I hope we will come to--then of necessity the dynamic considerations somehow get thrown out the window. That is, they do if you are not guided by meta-psychological considerations. The consequence is that the second phase of Freud's theory of affect and anxiety, namely the conflict theory, can be reconstructed only with the efforts you people made to find it.

Schafer: Would you agree that the danger situation implies the dynamic point of view, even though he doesn't deal with it explicitly?

Rapaport: Yes, I would think so. But you would have to break your back to explicate what is implied. It is less work to get it out of Freud's danger situation than out of this one, because this one is specified to be an anticipated traumatic situation, meaning that you have to bring in anticipation and the response to the anticipation specifically, and it gets to be a very complicated issue.

Let's go on to the economic, which I hope will be much easier for all of us. Dr. Plunkett has already cited the most striking economic proposition. P. 91 ("The Ego in Anxiety"):

"The ego reaction regresses accordingly.
Desomatization fails. No increase of instinctual demands, postulated by Freud to explain the 'economic justification' of this anxiety state, took place..."

You notice that here it becomes anti-dynamic, because what it says is that it is not the accumulation of frustration, the damming-up accumulation, which is the "economic justification."

Schafer: That wouldn't hold water anyway, because there would be a certain amount of instinctual discharge in the symptomatic behavior.

Rapaport: Partly that, and partly you have to say that it is not necessarily the full economic justification, but it is at a certain stage the partial economic justification. Otherwise, what comes wouldn't take place. So:

"No increase of instinctual demands, postulated by Freud to explain the 'economic justification' of this anxiety state, took place in this situation and yet the whole reaction points to a change in the economic position. The following conclusion could be proposed: In regression more than a memory is being re-enacted. Regression can restore archaic

situations and thus re-create the old economic conditions."

But why it should do that, why the whole regression should set in, is not explained, and can be explained only by what?

Plunkett: Dynamics.

Rapaport: Only dynamically. Do you see the point? I tried to locate where it is missing. The question that isn't asked is, "Why does the regression take place?"

White: He says on p. 95 that
"...high cathexis of defenses...in turn facilitates ego regression."

Rapaport: All right, but what causes the high cathexis?

White: The anticipated danger situation.

Rapaport: Either that or the direct pressure which makes for immediate reinforcement. And if it is the anticipation, then it is already the anticipation deriving from the pressure on the defensive system. You see, you can't avoid somewhere making the dynamic assumptions. Let's note quickly a number of the other economic propositions, if you have them--just the outstanding ones.

Schafer: He mentions Freud's view on p. 86 ("The Ego in Anxiety"), the dynamic-economic theory.

"The creation of high tension, which is experienced as displeasure and cannot be mastered by discharge, as exemplified by the birth situation, by the hungry infant missing his mother, or by sexual frustration."

Rapaport: Right. So the Freudian proposition which we discussed is stated here. This is one of the major economic propositions, and true, this is also a dynamic proposition. One could have brought it in earlier, and then all I would have said would have been that only where he quotes Freud does he give the dynamics, because Freud didn't abandon dynamics when he went into a structural theory. On the page before there is the old Freudian economic proposition: anxiety is libido which is deflected from its application. That's the ancient Freudian proposition, and it is worth mentioning.

Schafer: I have another quote from Freud on the next page, p. 87:

"It is only the magnitude of the excitation which turns an impression into a traumatic factor, which paralyses the operation of the

pleasure-principle and gives significance to the danger-situation." (Freud, New Introductory Lectures, p. 130).

- Rapaport: Yes. This is obviously again the Freudian point with which Schur copes by dividing the danger situation and the traumatic situation and dividing reaction from anticipation. How about going back to pp. 71 and 79?
- Gilmore: P. 71:
 "Nevertheless, in the final analysis, any danger remains the threat of intolerable inner tension.
 "With maturation the concept of danger undergoes a series of changes. The realization that an external object can initiate or end a traumatic situation displaces the danger from the economic situation to the condition which determines that situation. Then for the child it is no longer hunger that constitutes danger but it is the absence of the mother or, later, loss of love or the threat of punishment."
- Rapaport: Very good. Centrally, this is what proposition of Freud?
- Schafer: It's from The Problem of Anxiety.
- Rapaport: This is the double reversal: that to begin with there is an ancient coordination of internal state and reality, which is called the danger situation by Freud. Then this is reversed into the mounting of internal tension--what he calls hunger here. But then it is again turned into the external danger, which now is the absence of what would provide. So fundamentally it is a reality danger; then it is instinctual danger; then it is turned again to reality danger, signal-representation of danger. By the way, here again, as throughout The Problem of Anxiety and throughout Schur's paper, we have to realize that the traumatic situation could be, if we stretched a point, equated with the first model of passivity, a situation where there are no means to rid ourselves of tension.
- Miller: I don't see what you mean by "if we stretch the point." It didn't sound stretched at all.
- Rapaport: Well, stretched a point in that this is not classic psycho-analytic reasoning. I am just trying to make it very clear that if one takes activity-passivity issues seriously, in this whole discussion of the traumatic situation of the undifferentiated phase, and the consequences arising from the character of the undifferentiated phase, all that can be represented in

the terminology of activity-passivity, particularly in terms of the first model of passivity.

So we have economic propositions here, as you see, rather galore--too many, in fact, to take up. We will have to go on to the structural and genetic things. I will consider that the other points have been covered in a discursive way, not taking all the questions and answering them one by one, but as they came up. I will consider them answered unless you ask specific questions about them.

Schafer: Under economics earlier you mentioned p. 79 ("The Ego in Anxiety") and in looking it over I wondered if you meant the point about primary process and secondary process.

Rapaport: "...reappearance of discharge phenomena which were prevalent in infancy. The failure of desomatization represents physiological regression."

I wanted to have that rather than anything else first of all because I wanted to criticize anything people call physiological regression. You see, I feel that here Schur goes too far--regression is not something we can talk about in the physiological realm; at least, we don't know how to talk about it. Roy, where did you have that point?

Schafer: A little lower. It's a better formulation of the same point. P. 79 ("The Ego in Anxiety"):

"We can now establish another relation: on the one hand, co-ordinated motor action, desomatization, and secondary processes, on the other, random response, involvement of basic vegetative processes and primary processes.

Rapaport: It is a much better formulation, and also it is obviously grist for your mill, Roy, because it leads up to that anxiety or affect which looks like pure thought. You wanted us to bring that into the foundations of the theory. You know, I didn't try to minimize your point; I was just trying to say that if you want to make that single-sentence summary of what Schur's theory is about, then you had better not put this on the bottom, into the first part of the proposition, because it gets too complicated. But this is grist for your mill; it supports your point pretty neatly.

Now, what are the major structural propositions?

Miller: I think that one of them is one that we put down as economic but that I would consider primarily structural, on p. 79.

- Rapaport: Yes; how would you make that out?
- Miller: That is,
 "...on the one hand coordinated motor action, desomatization, and secondary processes,"
 --as against all those primary process sort of things. Since it is structuralization that makes that distinction, this is really in essence a structural point.
- Rapaport: I would have no doubt about it, but you remember that we came to this last sentence on desomatization, etc., which is so clearly structural, from the reappearance of discharge-phenomena which were prevalent in infancy, and there the major features are economic. But I would not question that this is a good summary of the over-all point.
- Schafer: Except that the reference to primary and secondary process has a strong economic loading.
- Rapaport: Yes, but then it has this primarily structural loading, since we don't consider the secondary process possible unless structures are present. This is really the structural proposition that is emerging from the genetic, here. And it still, therefore, has the economic connotations.
- But there is one which Roy referred to earlier which is clearly structural. What is it?
- Plunkett: There's one at the top of p. 75 ("The Ego in Anxiety"). This has to do with the two types of regression:
 "If we extend these conclusions to the phases beyond childhood we may formulate that regression within the organization, which now has developed into the ego may take place in two of its functions separately, each of these functions in turn being composed of many part-functions: in the evaluation of the precipitating excitation, and in the reaction to it."
- Rapaport: How do you make out that this is a structural proposition?
- Plunkett: It's talking of ego, of ego-functions, these functions in turn being composed of part-functions. These are all, I would say, structural...
- Rapaport: You mean that this differentiation which he is attributing to the ego cannot be conceived of otherwise than assuming that it has structural implications. Is that the point?
- Plunkett: Yes.

Rapaport: Well, if so, that's well taken. But it is not an explicit statement. Now where do we find explicit structural statements?

Schafer: It seems to me the basic one is what he quoted from Freud, that the ego is the seat of anxiety.

Rapaport: Yes, insofar as you take Freudian propositions. Where is that?

Schafer: P. 85, among other places.

- "(1) The ego as the seat of anxiety.
- (2) Anxiety as a response of the ego.
- (3) The role of anxiety and of the ego in defense and symptom formation, assigning to anxiety a necessary biological function."

Rapaport: No question about it, here the ego is spoken about as a definite structure, with the anxiety given a structural framework. But now specifically about anxiety, where do you find structural statements?

Gilmore: P. 75:

"Anxiety is always a reaction of the ego or of its matrix to a traumatic situation, or to danger, present or anticipated. Its manifestations depend on quantitative factors, on the relation between the precipitating excitation, and on the state of the ego."

Rapaport: There is no doubt that this spells out clearly the proposition on p. 85, and that it links anxiety to a specific state of the ego, that is when it becomes a powder-keg and when it doesn't. How about further structural points?

Plunkett: Pp. 72-73:

"The experience of the ego in such a situation is genetically linked to primary anxiety. Yet we could describe it better as awareness of danger, thus acknowledging its genetic link to anxiety, and still indicating that it has lost most of the qualities of that affect. In Rapaport's terminology: It has become completely structuralized. We see an analogous development of the reactions to inner danger, with the reaction to hunger..."

Rapaport: There is a further statement at the bottom of the page.

Plunkett: "What appears most important here is the comparison of this reaction to a thought process."

Rapaport: Please indicate where the Freud quotation is.

Miller: The middle of the indented paragraph on p. 73:
 "In such a contingency, the ego calls to its aid a technique, which is, at the bottom, identical with that of normal thinking. Thinking is an experimental dealing with small quantities of energy..." (New Introductory Lectures, p. 124)

Rapaport: Yes. Would you continue, Dr. Plunkett?

Plunkett: "That awareness of danger as an ego experience is closer to a thought process than to the affect of anxiety is emphasized by the fact that it shares with a thought process the potentiality to take place in the system unconscious--while an affect, according to Freud, cannot remain unconscious."

Rapaport: In other words, even if there is a segregated affect-charge, that may not be solidly segregated until it can manifest itself through thought-indications, anticipations, or awareness of danger. And this surely is a clear set of propositions going into the details of what structuralization of affect is. Already on p. 72 this proposition is prepared. Indeed, I would consider that p. 73, particularly with the preparation on p. 72, contains the major structural propositions concerning anxiety. What would you find on p. 72 which is clearly structural?

Plunkett: "With progressive maturation--at a point when we can already speak of ego development--we see parallel changes in the concept of, and the reaction to, danger. As the faculties of memory, anticipation, abstraction, and the time concept develop, danger can be anticipated. The reaction to anticipated danger becomes more and more remote from the traumatic situation. This transition is a gradual one and constantly subject to regressive phenomena. In transitional phases of this development, anticipation of danger can only be conceptualized when the danger is experienced as present. The small child has to repeat to himself, 'fire burns,' thus re-creating the danger situation.

"As experiences are gradually integrated into the ego, experience grows into knowledge. On the level of integrated knowledge, we develop the faculty to respond to certain danger situations, and especially

to potential danger, with a reaction which-- although genetically linked to primary anxiety, i.e., to the original reaction to a traumatic situation--has lost most of its characteristics. It has become desomatized, limited, purposeful. It is as remote from primary anxiety as thought is from action."

- Rapaport: You realize that I, for one, would criticize the term "primary anxiety" here.
- Miller: For one thing, it's not related logically to "secondary anxiety" because his secondary anxiety doesn't correspond to primary anxiety the way something secondary ought to.
- Plunkett: Earlier, on p. 68, he referred to the traumatic situation as the prototype of anxiety, which is a little better way of stating it.
- Rapaport: I would say that that's correct. Do you see why I would consider the stuff we had from these two pages as really directly pertaining to anxiety--insofar as there are structural propositions directly pertaining to anxiety, not ego and anxiety. These are really the pages where we have them. Does anybody know better ones?
- Schafer: There's a very similar one on p. 84 that mixes in several meta-psychological points of view; it brings in the conflict-free ego, which is a new slant on it.
 "Thus we may establish another relation: on the one side prevalence of secondary processes, capacity for neutralization, use of more 'mature' defenses, ability to use controlled regression without anxiety, ability for sublimation, restriction of reaction to danger to a thoughtlike awareness of danger, all constituting the 'conflict-free ego' (Hartmann, 39); and on the other side, prevalence of primary processes, primitive defenses, tenuous neutralization, tendency to regressive anxiety reaction with somatization, all representing the 'conflict ego' or as I would suggest to call it the 'primitive defense ego.'"
- Rapaport: Instead of "conflict-free ego" we would say autonomous ego. The terminology we might take exception to, but this is a very good summary of the whole thing. Both the anxiety-ego-structure relation and the anxiety-structure relation are summarized here in an all-over fashion, with the genetic issues also involved.
- Schafer: Economic too.

- Rapaport: That's right. And if one stretches it, one sees the adaptive business in it also.
- Suttenfield: In order for this to be complete, wouldn't we have to include his comments about the perception of inner danger, on p. 84? He starts out by saying that Freud is speaking of the lack of an internal protective barrier, and then goes on to say:
 "Even perception of inner danger is deficient, how much more so its anticipation. Here then is the second weak link in ego organization: We can master internal danger only indirectly, by mastery of the environment; i.e., we can provide food or find a sex partner. Hence the ego takes refuge in two devices. It treats inner danger as coming from the outside and tries to meet it with methods which were successful in the fight against external danger."
- Rapaport: I agree that this is an important point, but what is the structural consideration that is referred to here? You see, here again is the double reversal. What is the nature of danger, what is its relation to anxiety? Freud said in 1926 that ultimately all anxiety is fear of reality danger. But what is the essential structural consideration here? It is the inborn structuralized relationship of adaptedness, because in no other sense can we understand how the external danger becomes so important in the whole theory of anxiety. So the content of this perception of inner danger is that it is built up on the pattern of that danger given by the original situation of adaptedness.
- Well, we have to go on. Where are the most important genetic things? Actually, we have seen them already.
- Miller: I think one of them is the one we just went through on p. 72. It's at least as genetic as it is structural.
- Rapaport: That's right. But let's see, how about finding other...
- Suttenfield: There's one on p. 74:
 "We are dealing here with quantitative factors, and may establish the following ratio: The response is determined by the relation of the quantity of excitation to the reactive organization. This organization consists of the pre-ego stages of certain inborn mechanisms and will later develop into the ego. At any given moment this organization depends on a complex interplay of genetic and environmental factors."

Rapaport:

Correct. This is one of the important points. On pp. 75 and 79 you will find a little more about that. Take p. 79, for instance, about the regressive side of all this, which you have to consider in all genetic conceptions:

"The ego reacts to this evaluation, first, with an experience, i.e., awareness of danger, linked genetically with anxiety and, secondly, it takes certain measures to avoid or eliminate the danger, e.g., it establishes defenses. If it succeeds, it can prevent a different type of reaction, which would be closer to the reaction in primary anxiety. Thus the ego strives to prevent a regressive type of reaction to a regressive evaluation of danger. The various manifestations of such regressive reactions can be summarized as physiological regression."

--Here again we make the objection we made earlier about "physiological regression"--

"We may say in physiological terms: The ego regresses to certain automatic types of responses, more reminiscent of reaction by reflexes and instincts. Some patients with a combination of widespread phobias and compulsions show in their behavior a resemblance to that of... animals... Of greater practical importance and more clearly evident is the physiological regression implied by the reappearance of discharge phenomena which were prevalent in infancy. The failure of desomatization represents physiological regression."

So there you find a set of genetic connections.

Miller:

There's an over-all genetic one that verges on the adaptive too, on p. 70:

"From the undifferentiated state maturation proceeds in several directions. One, e.g., is the development of co-ordinated muscle function. More important to us is the maturation of the mental apparatus.

"Perception becomes the basis of reality testing while motility, at first serving only the discharge of tension, becomes its tool. We see the development of the functions of attention and judgment; we observe the emergence of memory from an autonomous inborn apparatus to a conceptual organization; the development of ideation and thought; there ensues the beginning of delay, anticipation, the faculty to neutralize energies, the faculty of abstraction."

Rapaport: Indeed this goes on into p. 71, but it is, as you put it, overall, and it is not specifically applied to affect.

Has anybody found a good adaptive proposition?

Plunkett: There's one on p. 73. After talking about the structuralization of anxiety, he goes on to say:

"This development is clearly of vital importance. It is not only a safeguard against uneconomical reactions, but the very faculty to respond to potential danger with a reaction which is as remote as possible from primary anxiety enables the ego to function under optimal conditions."

Rapaport: Yes, but this is still an adaptation in the terms of the early Freudian theory. Is there anything about adaptation which goes beyond that?

Miller: On p. 78:

"It is a triumph of adaptation when 'unrealistic thinking' can be incorporated in the conflict-free area of the ego, or if it can be used for creative purposes. In the state of anxiety we see one of the pathological outcomes."

Rapaport: I would just make the reservation that that goes the opposite way too. When that pathological-like outcome, anxiety, can be incorporated into the autonomous functioning--not conflict-free but autonomous--functioning of the ego, then you have a real triumph of adaptation. Anxiety by its very nature is always unrealistic, since it attributes something internal to something external, displaces it. When that can be incorporated into the autonomous functioning of the ego, then you really have internal and external perception and evaluation of dangers which safeguard the human individual in a far-reaching way. These are adaptive achievements indeed, and actually this pattern of thought we are discussing is one of the major patterns of thought taught to us by Hartmann in the big paper ("Ich-Psychologie und Anpassungsproblem"), namely that the unadaptive, regressive-like processes can be made adaptive on a reasonably high level of integration. This is an important adaptive proposition. (Hartmann probably generalized that from an earlier proposition of Kris's, and Kris later elaborated the same conception in great detail.) Anything else?

Miller: One that we had in another department, on p. 84:
"We can master internal danger only indirectly, by mastery of the environment..."

Rapaport: Yes, that was the point Dr. Suttentfield brought up. The same

point is made on p. 71:

"...tendency to treat any danger as outer danger."

Do we have any detailed other adaptive propositions?

Schafer: P. 85, Point 3, where he talks about Freud's considering anxiety as a necessary biological function.

Rapaport: You can see therefore that the adaptive point of view isn't as mistreated as the dynamic one, but really, the show is given over to the genetic, economic, and structural propositions.

Schafer: Under the potential danger I think it comes back again, for instance in his chart on p. 90, where he talks about "Evaluation of the danger and the means to prevent or meet it on a realistic basis. Preparatory steps." It's directly in the service of adaptation there.

Rapaport: That's right. Even that over-all proposition Dr. Miller quoted earlier shows that the development in general goes from problems of internal equilibrium to problems of external adaptation.

Schafer: All of this treatment, though, is still in terms of neurotic anxiety; and I wonder how the metapsychological treatment of objective fear, or so-called objective anxiety, would fit in here.

Rapaport: It is touched on here only in what we saw in connection with Dr. Suttentfield's question--that there is here a genetic adaptedness-relationship; and everything else about anxiety is presented as having only a semblance of reality. Ultimately there is that high level of integration where for adaptive purposes, the unrealistic anxiety-signal is incorporated into ego-functioning as an indication of external or internal danger. Only on these two extreme points does realistic anxiety come in.

Actually, not confining ourselves now to this paper, it is highly questionable that there is any other kind of realistic anxiety. The fear which is normally warranted breaks through at times, but otherwise usually even realistically dangerous situations first get internalized and then get externalized. How can you see that? I will spend one minute on this, because this is a very interesting and complex clinical problem. The question is this: are any of our responses to realistic situations which warrant fear responded to directly by fear? It's very hard to say, since we do not know very well the ancient fear--that original response to the original adaptedness to certain danger situations, like the chimpanzee's response to a severed head; or his response to certain kinds of snakes.

Those responses are unlearned in the chimpanzee, and in the gorilla too. We don't know about that ancient fear. So we don't know whether any of our reactions are the same as that, even where it is obvious that it is all right to be afraid, or that, as a matter of fact, one had better be afraid. The whole internal danger problem is involved; the internal danger is mobilized first by the external danger. The best clinical demonstration of that is this: there are certain people who do not experience what we usually call anxiety. They are a type of obsessive-compulsive people who have never developed a real anxiety reaction--in some of them no analysis will ever bring it out. In other words, that integration which would put the inborn response at the disposal of the ego did not take place, or once it took place it was suppressed by those defense mechanisms and other adaptive mechanisms which leave only the original traumatic situation, and its depressive development. These people will be depressed, blue and black instead of anxious. We ourselves belong to a group of people in whom the incidence of no anxiety but blue and black depressions is very high. Now this doesn't mean that none of us has ever experienced anxiety, or that none of us may be even racked by anxiety; but the chances that there will be several in such a group who know depression and not anxiety is higher than for any other group. That very fact shows that the likelihood of the involvement of internal anxiety in realistic fear-situations is overwhelmingly great. When the evaluation of the internal danger and its link to the inborn discharge-channels which are mobilized when anxiety is experienced--when those are not developed, then there is no reaction to such fear. These people are not afraid even when they are in a realistic danger situation. Let me assure you that the clinical evidence for this is overwhelming. These people are the people who either feel just absolutely empty and totally weakened in the face of danger, weakened to the point where they can't do anything; or else they face it as heroes. You see, the reasoning is a bit circuitous, but I do believe that it is probably the best, though inferential, evidence for this point.

Let's consider Schur finished and let's go to Jacobson. How does Jacobson use the concept of pleasure principle?

Schafer:

She uses it in terms of conscious experience. The footnote on p. 56 ("The Affects and Their Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities"): "Rapaport, in his recently written panel paper, questioned whether I did not equate the affects with the subjectively felt experiences or even with their pleasure-unpleasure qualities. Whereas in the first part of this presentation I had underscored these distinctions, I did use the example of orgasm, i.e., of a subjectively felt experience,

for the study of the relations of the affects and their pleasure-unpleasure qualities to the discharge processes. My conclusions, which are in harmony with Freud's last statement on the relations of pleasure-unpleasure to tension and relief, preclude using 'pleasure-unpleasure' as mere referents to the economical situation, as Rapaport does. In my presentation these terms refer to the qualities of the felt experience."

Rapaport: In one sentence, what does Jacobson say?

Schafer: She's not talking about the pleasure principle; she's talking about experiences of pleasure and unpleasure.

Rapaport: And she wants to use Freud's authority to detach pleasure-unpleasure from the tension-economics. Do you know where in Freud this attempt is strongly counteracted? In "The Two Principles," as well as in the beginning of "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," Freud describes pleasure and unpleasure in subjective terms, just as Jacobson does. Then later in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes"* he proceeds to say that it is necessary to relate this to issues of tension, but says that we have to keep all these assertions in a tentative state because we will have to elaborate how this will account for the complexities of the relationship between quantities of excitation and subjective pleasure and pain. He refers to the fact that certain tension-accumulations can be pleasurable and certain tension-discharges unpleasurable.

However, it is true what she says in reference to Freud's last statement. The major reference is to Beyond the Pleasure Principle, but it returns also in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, where Freud says that the rhythm and the change in the tension-state, rather than just a tension and lack of tension, are in question. It is particularly the rhythm on which he tried to concentrate in this paper.**

I agree that this is the major point, and would add that on p. 57 ("The Affects and Their Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities") she continues this point. That is, she says that inner tension may be pleasurable. And then:

"In this case, we should have to interpret the meaning of 'wishing' more broadly. Wishing would always be wishing for pleasure, but it

*Collected Papers, Vol. IV, p. 64.

**An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 16; also p. 109.

would represent a striving for cycles of pleasure having different qualities, alternating between tension and relief; cycles corresponding to our biological existence and rooted in our instinctual life."

Here the wishing and the pleasure are in what terms?

Suttenfield: Felt experience.

Rapaport: Felt experience and content terms. Talking about subjective experience is necessarily in content terms. And that is what we are trying to get away from, in order to have a metapsychological treatment.

Schafer: I have the feeling that she gets into this trouble because she is trying to deal with the whole problem essentially from the standpoint of economics, and that that approach lends itself to all kinds of oversimplifications, even about the changes in volume of excitation, because the complexities of structural and dynamic and genetic considerations would just get in the way of this kind of formulation.

Rapaport: This is already an answer to the point (e); you affirm that she is not being precise about these. Quite right. How about p. 58--do you have there one more clarifying point on Jacobson's use of the concept of the pleasure principle?

Miller: Pp. 57-58, "The Affects and Their Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities":
"In his final discussion of this issue Freud did not again mention an economical law, corresponding to the Nirvana principle, that would regulate the life instincts. He only mentioned the pleasure and reality principles."

Rapaport: What's wrong here?

Miller: She says "did not again mention an economical law... He only mentioned the pleasure...principle."

Rapaport: Do you see what we are up to? The pleasure principle is in the main an economic proposition. It deals with the direction of disposal of psychological energies. This sentence makes it more clear that pleasure-unpleasure is for Jacobson here conceived in subjective terms--in terms, for instance, of orgasm.

Plunkett: Her heading of this paragraph on p. 57 makes that abundantly clear. She says:

"Final Formulations Regarding the Relations
Between Pleasure-Unpleasure and Psychic Economy."

She doesn't say pleasure-unpleasure principle, she says pleasure-

unpleasure, and all the way through she's been talking of pleasure-unpleasure in terms of affective experience.

- Rapaport: Right. Here the Nirvana principle is the only economic law. What is that?
- White: Striving toward complete discharge.
- Rapaport: To a tensionless state. It is really, from the point of view from which we see the pleasure principle, a maximized pleasure principle. Is such a principle possible? In principle it is, but why isn't it possible in practice?
- Plunkett: Thresholds.
- White: You'd be dead.
- Rapaport: Because of thresholds, because you would be dead. Yes. One could say about the pleasure principle that fundamentally it strives for that but can't ever reach it because of the conditions under which it works. But that doesn't necessitate turning it into a Nirvana principle. All right. I interrupted you, sir. I hope you don't mind my quibbling, but I would like to understand this as precisely as we can and see with you clearly what's what.
- Miller: P. 58:
 "Practically, however, we all work on the premise of a principle of constancy--or, in modern terms, of a homeostatic principle--that must be consistent with the pleasure principle."
- Rapaport: Excuse me. How do you understand this; and, if one may ask, what's wrong about it?
- Schafer: Your objection to Schur seems relevant here. When you get to the homeostatic principle you're in a physiological realm.
- Rapaport: That's one way of putting it. The second way of putting it is, what is the homeostatic principle? After all, it is possible that she is talking about something psychological. The first thing wrong with it is that we have something here which isn't defined. This is what you can't do when you write, and this is what the reader has a right to expect that a writer will not do. You could say that I am doing something which is none of my business. My business here is to teach metapsychology, or discuss, learn with you. But we are trying to see what the papers are like and what they tell us. Now this tells us that a person can use a term where it isn't even clear. It is quite possible that she means a psychological homeostasis. And you understand

that this is the kind of stuff with which Kubie and Karl Augustus Menninger are also afflicted. One never knows precisely what is being talked about, the physiological or the psychological. There is reason here to assume, though, that she is talking about the psychological, because she says

"...the premise of a principle of constancy--
or, in modern terms..."

It may be that this is all just as that old Negro lady put it, who was working for a white woman, and one day the white woman saw her taking away a big brown bag, and was embarrassed to ask but couldn't stand not to ask, "What are you carrying away?" The black lady was even more embarrassed, and finally opened the bag, which was full of grapefruit peels. So the lady with embarrassment asked, "Why do you need all those grapefruit peels?" and the black lady said, "Oh, just to make my garbage stylish."

"...or in modern terms, of a homeostatic principle." One is never sure whether they want to make their garbage stylish or whether they have anything else in mind. You see, Roy, you may be falling for the embellishment of the garbage. I don't mean to call the paper garbage; this is an important paper, with many issues. Then comes the second thing that's wrong with it: where is the definition of the principle of constancy? What is that? The tendency to maintain a constant level of psychic excitation --where is that from? This is Freud's theoretical chapter in Studies in Hysteria. As early as all that, and with predecessors in Fechner, too. Obviously this is no innovation of Jacobson's. It comes back again in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes."

But let's remember to whom Jacobson usually refers. We have seen it before. ... Fenichel, Fenichel, Fenichel. I have pointed it out to you again and again in the discussion of the self. It is Fenichel who writes about the constancy principle, but he really means the pleasure principle. If you look at what Fenichel has to say, you will see that that's his generalized term for the pleasure principle. He does that because he wants to get away from a dualistic instinct-theory. Now Jacobson mixes it up with the homeostatic principle. Let's read on, Dr. Miller.

Miller:

P. 58:

"But how can the pleasure principle be identical with a constancy law if both tension and relief can induce either pleasure or unpleasure?"

Rapaport:

You see, this is the real problem that has to be explained. This is the ancient problem; this is the problem of forepleasure from 1905 in "Three Contributions"; this is the problem of masochism of 1914 in "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes."

- Schafer: In the "Wit" paper too.
- Rapaport: The problem is present in the "Wit" paper, but I would leave that to you because I don't know that paper well enough. And this is the problem picked up again in "The Economic Problem in Masochism" and in Beyond the Pleasure Principle--meaning 1920 and 1924. We have a very general answer to this question. What accounts for these discrepancies between tension and tension-relief on the one hand, and pleasure and unpleasure on the other? We have said it already today. Two words.
- Miller: I have two words, though they probably aren't the same ones. For whom? Freud makes that point in Chapter VII ("The Interpretation of Dreams"), about what is a wish-fulfillment. And the question is, for what psychic institution is it a wish-fulfillment?
- Rapaport: Very well put; the question is, "Pleasure for whom?" But what is the implication in there? This is already a complex idea. What is the implication of this "for whom"?
- Miller: Differentiation.
- White: Structure.
- Rapaport: Structural conditions. Those are the two words I had in mind.
- Miller: That's what I meant by differentiation.
- Rapaport: Yes. The "for whom" already implies it. Okay. The structural conditions is our answer to that. Roy, you look as if you did not like it.
- Schafer: I'm still thinking of a point I made before, that if you think of it only from the standpoint of economics, it creates some trouble. In terms of awareness or fantasy, certain conditions of being stimulated could be intensely gratifying of certain wishes, even though at the moment the tension level may seem to be rising. That would be one consideration. Then the whole question of anticipation would have to be considered. Here you're thinking of the momentary experience; if you think in terms of a temporal span of events--this is the forepleasure ideal.
- Rapaport: Yes. But couldn't this also be subsumed under the general heading of either "for whom" or what structural conditions obtain?
- Schafer: I suppose I'm introducing dynamic considerations there.
- Rapaport: You are introducing both the dynamic and the economic, and

justly so. But they are both dependent on structural conditions. Jacobson underplays the structural conditions and overemphasizes the economic conditions, which are then treated under Nirvana, pleasure, homeostatic and constancy principles--suddenly the whole thing has bred four different principles where actually there is only one. I believe that that should serve as the answer to the first question (3a) and also to the second (3b).

Now for (3c): What is Jacobson's explanation of discharge and tension affects, and what metapsychological points of view does the explanation imply? She takes off from Brierley's conception of discharge and tension affects. Did you figure out what Brierley's idea was?

Schafer:

Brierley is quoted on p. 48 of Jacobson's article ("The Affects and Their Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities"):

"All our modern conceptions of the relation of anxiety to symptom formation, of its role in development, contradict the idea that affect is itself a discharge--and support the view that it is a tension phenomenon impelling to discharge either in the outer or in the inner world. Both the fact that affect is a mode of consciousness and clinical experience induce us to place affect, both topographically and in time-order, in the middle of the instinct-reaction arc...

"The conception of affects as tension phenomena is of course in line with Freud's earliest formulations of the working of the psychic apparatus and the pain-pleasure principle. On the quantitative side we have, I think, to conceive of some threshold above which instinct-tension becomes appreciable as affect, and of a higher threshold, which may be attained either by the strength of the stimulus itself or by damming due to frustration, above which affect becomes intolerable and necessitates some immediate discharge, either outwards or inwards." (Brierley, "Affects in Theory and Practice," Int. J. Psa., 1937).

Rapaport:

How do we understand this statement of Brierley's?

Schafer:

It's a dynamic and economic statement.

Rapaport:

It's a dynamic statement in regard to--?

Schafer:

Damming up and--

- Rapaport: Instinct and the damming up of instinct.
- Schafer: And then, beyond a certain point, acting as a mode of discharge.
- Rapaport: And that's the economic proposition. But there are structural points involved. What are they?
- Several: Thresholds.
- Rapaport: The damming up concerns two different thresholds, according to her. So this is a theory of tension affects. Why does she need to introduce tension, according to this statement? From what metapsychological point of view do we understand that she has to introduce tension affects and deny that affects are centrally discharge-phenomena?
- Several: Structural.
- Rapaport: Certainly. Empirically, it is obvious that we experience tension affects. Don't we? Ill-ease, restlessness, subjective discomfort--before there is discharge. Out of that she makes a theory. The only way to account metapsychologically for these tension affects is by means of structures, since if there were no structures, then the accumulation of instinct-charge would simply result in discharge.
- Miller: There wouldn't even be any accumulation.
- Rapaport: So one could hypothesize an original phase, an original state, where it would be all discharge.
- Schafer: I think you're playing favorites with the structural point of view. The way she states it it's just as dynamic as structural.
- Rapaport: Certainly the formulation is dynamic. I agree, though I am also perfectly content to find that I play favorites. But how are we to account for the observation of tension affects? Discharge affects would imply the dynamic point of view; both tension and discharge would imply the economic point of view. The genetic point of view does not really come in here. The crucial point is injected when Brierley says that affects are not all discharge-phenomena, as Freud thought they were. Do you have the reference in which Freud said that affects are discharge-phenomena?
- Miller: "The Unconscious," p. 111 [Collected Papers, Vol. IV].
- Rapaport: Absolutely. As a matter of fact, there is a slight hint of that in the Seventh Chapter, but it is made explicit first in "The Unconscious." So she is trying to say that it isn't what Freud says. The new thing she introduces is purely structural. Is

that playing favorites still? If so, explain.

- Schafer: No, not when it's in terms of what is the new thing she introduces. She's working from later Freud here; where she introduces this quotation, it's based on The Problem of Anxiety, on the relation of anxiety and symptoms. That is what Jacobson next attacks her for, for being influenced too much by the theory of anxiety.
- Rapaport: In other words, Jacobson tries to revert to the original Freud, tries to show that affects are first of all discharge-phenomena. Her intent is to produce what kind of theory of affects?
- Schafer: Economic.
- Rapaport: Yes, but a theory in regard to discharge and tension. What theory should it be? Will it be a discharge-theory or a tension-theory?
- Schafer: She's trying to work out a fusion of the two.
- Rapaport: That's right. So you can see that she is really bent upon clarifying this relationship, and that's an important thing to do. There is an important point here, because Brierley indeed went very far in saying that all affects are tension affects, and that the discharge is simply one of the possible effects of the tension.
- Schafer: Jacobson argues against that. She says that if you eat and you enjoy the eating, that's not a tension-phenomenon; it's connected with gratification, like orgasmic pleasure. This seems to me to be based on kind of a behavioristic view which is very unanalytic. How we eat as grownups and enjoy our food is extremely complicated --we have so many thresholds, structures, derivative things, that simply to say that it's a simple discharge with pleasure and so can't be a tension phenomenon doesn't seem to hold up very well.
- Rapaport: But she doesn't stop there. As you said before, she is trying for a theory which unites both of them. Now what is that theory; how does she unite them?
- Miller: P. 53, "The Affects and Their Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities":
 "Thus the orgasmic discharge experience is not simple pleasure in relief, but uses--or, rather, vacillates between--two opposite pleasure qualities: a high excitement pleasure expressive of tension mounting to a climax, and a relief pleasure indicating the final decline of tension. And we must conclude from the quality of the orgasmic end pleasure itself that the discharge

process encompasses both mounting and falling tension; and that both can induce pleasure, though of changing quality."

- Rapaport: This is indeed the description of her intent. Now how does she explain how that is done?
- Schafer: She says on p. 54 that the tension may increase even while the discharge-process has begun. There's kind of a temporal lag phenomenon.
- Rapaport: What is the simile by which she illustrates that?
- Gilmore: The bath-tub, with water coming in and going out simultaneously.
- Rapaport: Yes. Now how would you formulate her final theory?
- Schafer: On p. 57 she has a statement:
 "If this is valid, we must conclude that tension pleasure may induce the urge for higher excitement; climactic pleasure, the urge for relief; and relief pleasure, the longing again for pleasurable tension. This schematization would certainly reflect the dynamic course of life, which represents not only inevitable changes between pleasure and unpleasure --stemming from the demands of reality--but, in so far as it is pleasurable, alternates continuously between excitement and relief pleasures which correspond to rises and falls of psychic excitation around a medium level."
- Rapaport: Yes. This summarizes really what she has to say. But let me ask: do we have an explanation here of excitement-pleasure? Do we have an explanation here of in what sense is it pleasurable to have mounting tension? We have an explanation in Dr. Miller's "for whom," that while tension accumulates in one system, in another system tension is discharged. But does she have an explanation?
- Schafer: Maybe I should read the next paragraph (p. 57):
 "In this case, we should have to interpret the meaning of 'wishing' more broadly. Wishing would always be wishing for pleasure, but it would represent a striving for cycles of pleasure having different qualities, alternating between tension and relief; cycles corresponding to our biological existence and rooted in our instinctual life."
- Rapaport: Whatever that means.

- Schafer: It's sort of a boredom theory; she postulates a need for change.
- Rapaport: Oh, it leans as hard on Fenichel's boredom theory as anything can. But how is it explained? Does her bath-tub have any explanatory contents for the excitation-pleasure? Her explanation is that while discharge takes place new tension is still accumulating, with new stimulation, and the climax is reached when the balance is changed. Actually, as she describes it, all the pleasure comes from discharge. There is no specific explanation of how an excitation-pleasure could exist, of how it is possible that one should have pleasure while tension still mounts. Was the excitation-pleasure explained in Fenichel?
- Schafer: His is more of a forepleasure theory, isn't it? The promise of ultimate gratification?
- Rapaport: That's right. So insofar as excitation-pleasure is considered by Fenichel, it is an aim-inhibited pleasure. He had an explanation for it, in classic terms. He also had a new motivation arising out of this business, which is motivation for change. In Jacobson, all this is thrown together. What about her affect-classification? Who has the reference?
- Schafer: P. 46:
 "(1) simple and compound affects arising from intrasystemic tensions:
 (a) affects that represent instinctual drives proper; i.e., that arise directly from tensions in the id (e.g., sexual excitement, rage);
 (b) affects that develop directly from tensions in the ego (e.g., fear of reality and physical pain as well as components of the more enduring feelings and feeling attitudes, such as object love and hate or thing interests);
 (2) simple and compound affects induced by intersystemic tensions:
 (a) affects induced by tensions between the ego and the id (e.g., fear of the id, components of disgust, shame, and pity);
 (b) affects induced by tensions between ego and superego (e.g., guilt feelings, components of depression)."
- Rapaport: It is a basically structural theory; indeed, you could call it a pure ego-theory. Right.
- Schafer: Intersystemic.

Rapaport: It is also an intersystemic theory. Just about everything else is missing. That in this whole treatment the adaptive role of the affect as communication is missing goes without saying. We can't complain about neglect of the communication-adaptation problem, because all psychoanalysts neglect that. But it is striking, in the context of the paper, that the economic theory is missing. Because of that, the paper falls into two parts. Nevertheless, it is a great advance because it really tries to make a classification in terms of structural considerations.

Schafer: Incidentally, it's a tension-theory of affect too; it's intra-systemic and intersystemic.

Rapaport: So the dynamic point of view is invoked here too.

We have agreed that time won't permit us to take up all of the questions in the syllabus and that we will omit detailed discussion of point (4). We have already touched on the question of Schur and Jacobson on psychosomatics. Now before we go on let me try to clarify the considerations pertaining to this paper on cyclothymic depression. There are a number of statements in it which are definition-like, with some clarification as to what narcissistic libido is, what narcissistic identification is. P. 55, "Contribution to the Metapsychology of Cyclothymic Depression":

"The system ego is not only cathected..."

--This is very unclear. I think it should be read, "is cathected not only..."--

"with narcissistic libido. It is endowed with psychic forces that are used for the cathexis of object--"

--Forces can't be used as cathexis for anything.--

"--of object- and self-representations and for the corresponding ego functions. Hence, narcissistic libido is only that part of the libidinous energy in the system ego"

--So narcissistic cathexis is a part of the cathexis of the system ego--

"that is used for the cathexis of the self-representations, in contradistinction to the object-representations."

This is narcissistic cathexis. This is rather in keeping with what Hartmann had to say about it, but it adds that this is, nevertheless, ego-libido. That's different from Hartmann's conception, where narcissistic cathexis may be in any system.

"Gratifications, gained from sexual or other ego activities, are object-libidinous, in so far as their goal is the satisfaction on personal and thing objects; they are narcissistic gratifications, in so far as they aim as well at the raising of the libidinous cathexis of

the self-representations and at the satisfaction of the self. And, finally, what we call 'narcissistic identification,' the mechanism that plays such an important role in melancholic depression, must be defined not as an identification of the ego with the object but as partial or total fusions of self- and object-representations in the system ego."

The confusion here is that we have come to regard identifications as structural changes of the ego. Thus narcissistic identifications would also be that. The self, according to Jacobson, reflects the ego also; and if the ego has such an identification, the self may be formed accordingly. The narcissistic identification therefore would be one, if we keep that in mind, in which the ego takes on a form of the self, and the self takes on the form of the ego, and a circularity is established between the ego-structure in general and that subordinate structure of the ego which is called self. That would be one possible way to understand this.

Schafer: That's the one she rejects in her next sentence. She says:
"In this type of identification the ego does not assume the characteristics of the object."

Rapaport: "...of the love-object." No, but the shape of the self it can still assume. Always, when you make an identification, first of all the object appears in the inner world as a representation. Without that it is not possible. That's the mediating step. Then this representation in the internal world becomes a template for forming a part of the structure or transforming certain structural relationships in the ego-structure. Now it is possible to use that part of the internal world which is the self-representation for such a template. (Am I making clear what I mean by template? I mean it in the same sense that a gene is considered to be a template for organ-formation; or in other terminology, a pattern on which something is formed, a die, a special type of cutting tool which provides a pattern for something else.) The objects, as represented in the internal world, can serve as templates, as dies, on which the ego-structure or part of it or structural relations are formed. This is the point I would like to make.

Jacobson, however, says that the narcissistic identification is when partial or total fusion of self- and object-representations in the system ego takes place; that is, in that part of the system ego which is the internal world, the part in which such representations exist. Now we are not accustomed to talking about representations or any functions of them as identifications, except for one--when the representations serve as templates for ego-structure.

Schafer: Isn't she essentially throwing out the idea that this is an

identification? She's saying that it's a different thing, because the ego does not take on the characteristics of the object; that to her is crucial to the concept of identification.

Rapaport: Well, then why call it narcissistic identification?

Schafer: Well, but she's very cautious about that. She says "what we call narcissistic identification."

Rapaport: Yes. But still narcissistic identification does mean that kind of identification which does appear as identification in depressions. Empirically it is an identification. I'm just trying to tell you that all this caution won't avail, because the empirical finding from which Freud started out in "Mourning and Melancholia" was an identification.

Schafer: But she rejects that. She denies those empirical observations.

Rapaport: So she is going on the line that there is such a fusion. The self is experienced or treated as though it were the love-object. Obviously, this introduces all the considerations that were already present in The Ego and the Id, where the love-object, when it is abandoned, becomes an identification. In other words, she protests in vain that this is a very different thing. That fusion which she makes the basis of the narcissistic identification is a consequence of the narcissistic identification, if it is anything.

Now what is the consequence of this for affects? If you go to p. 59 ("Contribution to the Metapsychology of Cyclothymic Depression"), you will find the issue of self-esteem discussed:

"Self-perception is an ego function. Self-judgment, though founded on the subjective inner experience and on objective perception by the ego of the physical and mental self, is partly or even predominantly exercised by the superego, but is also partly a critical ego function whose development weakens the power of the superego over the ego. Self-esteem is the emotional expression of self-evaluation..."

--Self-esteem is not an expression. Concomitant, she probably means--

"...and of the corresponding libidinous and aggressive cathexis of the self-representations."

Now note that if you take this to be a concomitant, then you get here a conflict theory of affects, because self-esteem indeed has an affect character. The affective antipode of it is guilt.

"The foregoing discussion leads to the conclusion that self-esteem does not necessarily reflect the

tension between superego and ego. Broadly defined, self-esteem expresses the discrepancy between or accordance of the wishful concept of the self and the self-representations."

Well, how much that wishful concept of the self is regulated by the superego and by the id is yet another question. We are not discussing that, but it is a discrepancy, or a clash, rather. So you notice that at this point the whole concept of tension is brought back. This is really the only point I tried to make, and the reason I wanted to discuss the narcissistic identification is simply to prepare for that, because without understanding narcissistic identification it is not quite possible to see how the self-esteem is relegated here to the discrepancy between the wishful concept of the self and the self-representations. When such a fusion takes place between ego and objects, those major objects which are the templates for the superego-identification fuse, according to her, with the self-representations, and therefore you have, in the self and self-representation discrepancy, the whole superego business represented. After all, some objects served as the prototype for superego-formation. This is simply a language translation here into self terminology of what we have known all the time about the superego. What Freud said: superego-ego clash, depression. Nothing particularly new about it. What is new is only that, in contrast to the other paper ("The Affects and Their Pleasure-Unpleasure Qualities") it is a clear-cut conflict-theory of affects.

We will have to go on now to point (5). Let me try to shorten this a little so we can finish. Do you by chance have in the "Ego Autonomy" manuscript the passages that tell you what stimulus-nutrient is about? (This comes from Piaget; all I have done is to try to apply it in a new context.)

Miller:

There is a passage on p. 15 ("Ego Autonomy" manuscript): "The data from the Hebb and Lilly experiments seem to imply that these structures depend upon stimulation for their stability. Or, to use Piaget's terms, they require stimulation as nutriment for their maintenance. When such stimulus-nutrient is not available, the effectiveness of the structures in controlling id impulses is impaired and some of the ego's autonomy from the id is surrendered. Analysis of the techniques of inducing hypnosis seems to corroborate this inference. Indeed the fact that drive intensification interferes with ego autonomy can also be interpreted as the effect of drive representations commanding attention and thus making unavailable the attention cathexes necessary for the effective intake of stimulus-nutrient. The interference of

passionate love and deep mourning with the ego's autonomy and reality testing are familiar phenomena. The work of mourning appears to be actually the process by which the very state of absorption which militates against the intake of stimulus nutriment is overcome. Without assuming that these structures are self-sustaining but need stimulus-nutriment for their maintenance, the very process of therapy would be inconceivable."

Rapaport: As you read about stimulus-nutriment, did you think of any examples from everyday experiences and of any examples from therapy which make it plausible that you have always known about this issue?

White: Highway hypnosis would be a good everyday example.

Rapaport: That's a very good example, but it is not quite an everyday occurrence. This is the kind of phenomenon we know about from the study of hypnosis. It will be treated in detail in a forthcoming book by Gill and Brenman which I alluded to in the autonomy paper. How about an example that you know from everyday life and which we have never examined psychoanalytically? There are many of them. For example, is it not correct that all of us need foils: you know what I mean when I say foil? For instance, do you believe that when I insist that you have your references clear at hand that I do that just to make your life difficult? Those references are your foil. They help you to connect thought-patterns, which otherwise would not be connected so effectively. You need some foil like that when you are at a case conference. Isn't it so that when certain people speak, what they say helps you to express yourself clearly? If it were simply because you want to imitate them or repeat them, or oppose them, that would be the most crude and primitive form of this nutriment. But what they say helps you to start moving your own thought-apparatus. Such an input from familiar people helps you to be yourself. Is it not true that all of us find our capacity to think or our sense of humor working more easily when we are with the usual people and in the usual situations? This is not really true for all of us. There are some people who are entirely unable to do it in their own environment but can do it very well only when among strangers. We would say that the control-structures of such people are always working overtime. Some of us can't be humorous with older people or if authorities are present, but can crack the wildest jokes when with contemporaries or younger people.

Schafer: In Fenichel's discussion of boredom ("On the Psychology of Boredom") he talks about boring people; I think this same issue comes in there. He assumes there is a class of people who are

bored, and characterizes them as not providing the stimulation for certain forms of release, so that the person who is being bored is left in a tension-state.

Rapaport: You have the key phrase? ... P. 301, "On the Psychology of Boredom":

"I am not bored; he bores me."

It is the point. I am myself not bored, I have all kinds of things that I could do or could say. It is like the little boy's answer to the teacher who asked him a question which he couldn't answer, and the teacher tells him the answer. He says, "Teacher, I knew it all the time, but you didn't ask the question to fetch it." ... So you can see that this concept of stimulus-nutrient, which is borrowed from Piaget, is not unfamiliar to you from everyday-life experience. What we do not know is whether or not there are simpler or more effective ways to conceptualize these same issues psychoanalytically. For example, it might be possible to conceptualize these issues in terms of psychoanalytic drive-theory. But to do so would not be a simpler explanation. The stimulus-nutrient explanation is a simpler explanation because it is very close to the phenomena. If it can be proven that in itself, with its implications, it really accounts for these phenomena without contradicting anything else in the theory, it would be the simplest possible explanation--where it explains. The question is only does it explain? All the autonomy-explanations which renounce reduction to drives are simple explanations, in this sense. Whether they are effective, whether they reveal sufficiently what the phenomenon has in it--that is not certain. That they have a great economy is certain, because to trace these phenomena which we were just talking about to drives, even in the simple case of boredom, causes many new implications to be introduced. I am just trying to clarify for you what merit such a concept may have, and what kind of deficiencies it may have.

I want to ask one more question about it. Could you state in your own words what this stimulus-nutrient has to do with autonomy of the ego from the environment?

Miller: It postulates that stimulus-nutrient is essential to the maintenance of ego-structure, so complete autonomy of the ego from the environment is not possible.

Rapaport: Precisely. According to the stimulus-nutrient concept, the autonomy of the ego is always relative. To the degree to which we are dependent upon stimulus-nutrient for the maintenance of ego-structures, the autonomy of the ego from the environment is only relative--environment as stimulus-nutrient or more generally as environmental stimulation or most generally as reality-relationships.

Now let's see what Jacobson has to say about supplies.

- Gilmore: On p. 67 ("Contribution to the Metapsychology of Cyclothymic Depression") she says:
 "What they require is a constant supply of love and moral support from a highly valued love-object, which need not be a person but may be represented by a powerful symbol, a religious, political, or scientific cause, or an organization of which they feel a part. As long as their 'belief' in this object lasts, they will be able to work with enthusiasm and high efficiency."
- At the bottom of the page she says:
 "When we have an opportunity to observe both, the patient and his partner, we frequently find that they live in a peculiar symbiotic love relationship to each other; they feed on each other."
- Rapaport: Which part of this goes beyond the point of stimulus-nutrimment in the sense we have discussed it so far?
- Gilmore: There is an emphasis on a specific love-object.
- Rapaport: Yes, but let's come to that in a minute. There is another point where it goes far beyond what we have discussed so far.
- White: The emphasis on a powerful symbol, a religious, political, or scientific cause--
- Rapaport: Yes, an organization of which one feels himself to be a part.
- White: I think this is the essence of the work we have been doing at Riggs on the therapeutic effect of the hospital community. We have found that unless the hospital community develops traditions, symbols, etc., patients are more vulnerable to inner drives than they have to be.
- Rapaport: Or they are vulnerable to excessive dependence on single people, which is more to the point under consideration here. What points in the "Ego Autonomy" paper are relevant to all this?
- Miller: Well, for one thing, the way in which symbols and traditions can sustain ego-structure in the absence of the usual environmental stimulus-nutrimment.
- Rapaport: Very well. Can somebody locate the passages which deal with this inner source of stimulus-nutrimment?
- Gilmore: On the bottom of p. 32 ("Ego Autonomy" manuscript):
 "It is known that there were people who maintained their ego autonomy in spite of all the techniques of 'brain-washing,' though only a few

survived to tell the tale. We are familiar with the Englishman who in total isolation from the setting which would provide the natural nutriment for his properties, traditions, outlook and values, maintains these essentially unchanged in the solitude of the jungle or the desert. Last but not least, clinical and therapeutic observation shows that defenses (in the form of character traits as well as symptoms) survive even though their environmental nourishment is for all practical purposes absent, or has to be 'provoked' by the person himself.

"In the case of defense structures, we have an explanation of the survival of structures without stimulus-nutriment: they are maintained, ultimately, by internal (drive) stimulus-nutriment."

- Rapaport: This is the theoretical conclusion, then. Can anybody propose another point?
- Schafer: There's a statement on p. 34 that's little broader, I think.
"It seems safe, then, to make the tentative assumption that in certain people strikingly but probably in all to some degree, external stimulus-nutriment may be replaced by internal nutriment. We have seen that this nutriment may be provided by the drive or by the superego, but we may assume that it can come from other structures also."
- Rapaport: For instance, the identity-structures of Erikson, the values and ideologies connected with them, etc. Now what other passages are there in Jacobson ("Contribution to the Metapsychology of Cyclothymic Depression") concerning this supply?
- Schafer: On p. 54 she talks about the dependence of the differentiation of self and object on the parental love, frustration, prohibition, demand.
- Rapaport: So we find in Jacobson some developmental propositions like those in Erikson. What other relevant passages do we have in Jacobson's paper? Take p. 72:
"Frequently we observe that manic-depressives live on their ideals or their idealized partners rather than on their own real self."
And p. 77:
"We will now investigate the defenses that the patient uses for this purpose. Since his libidinous resources are fading, his first line of

defense will be to turn to the real object world for support."

--You notice, the libidinal* resources are fading, and he must turn to the real object-world--

"He will try to resolve his inner conflict by help from without."

When he can't find the permissive internal "yes," he demands it from the outside. You have seen it in your patients and in yourselves. It happens to all of us when we are exhausted after a great effort. Then we need the repetition of that external praise from which our inner structures were originally built.

Now we have to go on to Bibring. Did you find some passages in Bibring concerning supply?

Plunkett: There is one on p. 36 ("The Mechanism of Depression"):
 "The 'orally dependent type' which constantly needs 'narcissistic supplies' from outside, represents perhaps the most frequent type of predisposition to depression, which is not surprising if one takes into consideration the fact that the infant has actually no power over its objects and the necessary supplies it has to receive from them, that it is entirely dependent on the benevolence of the environment for the gratification of his needs and maintenance of his life."

Rapaport: Very good. Now can you explain what, from the genetic point of view, this has to do with the stimulus-nutrient story? In what sense are we not oral-dependent types, insofar as we are not? What happened to us, or what did we achieve?

Miller: Activity in the place of passivity.

Rapaport: I would say yes, but would be talking pro domo. I mean, trying to polish my own brass cannon. I would like to stay within the classical theory, please.

Schafer: Internal regulation; the state of self-esteem.

Rapaport: On a high level, that's what it is. But what happens to an infant, or to a child, when he becomes an oral-dependent type? How does that happen, that which is described in what we just read?

*Though it is not the first opportunity in this transcript, this is a point at which an editor may point out that the adjectival form of libido is libidinal. "Libidinous," a reputable non-technical word, means "lewd; lascivious," not necessarily the same thing. --SCM

- Schafer: That's where the signals don't work; where the mutuality-issue comes in. I think Bibring refers to it too. P. 37:
 "If frustration is continued, however, in disregard of the 'signals' produced by the infant, the anger will be replaced by feelings of exhaustion, of helplessness and depression. This early self-experience of the infantile ego's helplessness, of its lack of power to provide the vital supplies, is probably the most frequent factor predisposing to depression."
- Rapaport: That's one solution. Frustration can lead to the depressive solution, which may go with the oral-dependent solution or may not. But how does one become oral-dependent and not depressive?
- Plunkett: By seeking the object in reality. In the face of frustration, the person turns to and manipulates the environment to find the gratifying object--
- Rapaport: If the solution is neither depression nor the solution that you describe, what happens? Control is established. The absence of the object is turned into structure-formation, which will contain impulses and build inner structures which sooner or later will produce internal supplies. If the structure-formation is sufficiently differentiated, inner supplies will be created.

Let me illustrate that to you by a social phenomenon. In a too-homogeneous family-group, one member's depression upsets everybody. In a broader group, but one with only one focus, the leader--the leader goes crazy and the whole damned group goes crazy. But if there is a multifocal group, one leader can be crazy and the others can take over. The people flock around another leader when one is gone. There is within the group an internal bufferage against the outer world. The outer world hits one leader too hard; he becomes depressed but the group isn't shattered. This is the same principle used in building ships with water-tight compartments. You see, these issues are very complicated but they are also very simple.

In the building of inner resources, if the solution is normal the strength and equipment of the individual is good enough to stand the frustration he meets. The frustration does not exceed in intensity and duration and quality the limits for that individual, and from this frustration-experience structures are built which sooner or later amount to inner resources. They link up with other structures which are similarly created. Under average expectable environmental conditions we are never assaulted from all sides at once, and a shunting takes place.

Obviously one could express that in economic terms. One could express it in dynamic terms, in defense terms, as we have already done. One can express that in adaptive terms, this way: when maladaptation in one direction takes place, one starts working in the other direction. For instance, the people who, when cheated or disappointed in love, turn inward and study, or in an arid situation where there is nothing, look for books, look for ways to develop their own talents for writing or painting, or anything like that. This is a shunting. You can explain it adaptively, economically, structurally; all that can be done. But genetically it remains a question of supply. If there is only an average expectable frustration and if there is average expectable equipment to cope with it, then inner structure results that serves as an inner source of supplies.

- Miller: Shouldn't you add "only average expectable gratification" to the necessary conditions?
- Rapaport: That's right, because excessive gratification can also lead to the oral-dependent solution. All these can occur. The point is only that never is this genetic origin totally exorcised by this development; therefore some external supply is always necessary. What are Bibring and Jacobson telling us about all this?
- Schafer: Well, in one respect they're telling us that too little autonomy from the environment in this regard is an essential aspect of depressive pathology.
- Rapaport: Correct. Moreover, they are telling us that in all of us there are inner sources of supplies, and also that we need outer supplies. In some people the inner supplies are too easily exhausted, and if this problem was already depressively solved once in childhood, a depressive ego-state will be reinstated when these supplies again get exhausted. So you see, there is some reason to say that such a simple concept--simple in the sense we defined a little earlier--has some application, and people who dealt with the whole problem without any regard for such a concept came to similar conclusions. This would not be a proof yet that this is an effective--not only a simple but an effective --concept, but at least it makes it plausible that it might be. The fact that a number of people working from diverse points of view have come to this concept or something very similar makes its validity probable. Now why do I drive this home? Partly because I want to make you clearly aware of what the concept is like and what the problems are about it, but partly because I want you to see how you can judge concepts in the future when you read the literature alone. Anybody can propose a concept. If it is carefully proposed it is worth considering. It is even more important if you discover that it can be applied in an area from which it was not directly derived.

Now let's turn to the paper by Schmale, the "Memoranda." Who has the passage from it which is crucial to our discussion?

- Miller: At the bottom of p. 2 he says:
 "I propose that we should use the term object to designate that which is apart from, not a part of, the structure of a biological system or systems which is necessary for the progressive functioning, that is, growth and development, of the system, and in repeatedly functioning with the system allows the system to become more autonomous as well as becoming a necessary part of another more complex system."
- Rapaport: Any comments? What does this mean?
- Miller: It says that the organism he's talking about needs supplies in order to develop and keep going.
- White: Not only to develop and keep going but become independent.
- Schafer: The two aspects of relative autonomy are both in the conception of object as he presents it. The object is necessary for the system to develop, but it's also necessary for the system to develop independence from the environment.
- Rapaport: He also says it is necessary for the system to become integrated with the environment, and with the other systems so developed. In other words, it is a definitional attempt to express all that we are talking about--to express it by defining the word object in a broad way. This, for a young man, is really quite an achievement. How did he come to it?
- Miller: He came to it from the topic of depression in relation to separation.
- Rapaport: They found separation to be an etiological agent of a series of psychosomatic disorders in which they could demonstrate that the disorder itself was preceded by something that looked like a depression. They found that the depression, with great frequency, was preceded by some separation, that is, loss of object, or if you please, loss of supply. And this held for a whole series of diseases as varied as ulcerative colitis and leukemia. Now please, I am not making psychosomatics, I am just telling you how he came to it. These notes of Schmale's that we have are from the seminars they had about this type of psychosomatic investigations, in the course of which questions came up of how to define separation and how to define depression and its relation to object-loss. That led to this definition. They tried in a definitional way, from defining the object, to reach this

whole area. There are many ways to do it. We have approached this area through certain considerations of conflict and through the consideration of the primary and secondary processes. But, as we see from Schmale, one can arrive at the same point without using the same theoretical path. Science is sovereign.

There are still a great many issues concerning affects that we haven't touched on, but we have done as well as we could.